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ABSTRACT 
Research on information technology outsourcing (ITO) and business process outsourcing 
(BPO) has consistently found that client firm capabilities, provider firm capabilities, and 
governance mechanisms (contractual and relational) are key determinants of outsourcing 
performance. These key determinants work together to affect outsourcing performance, however, 
the information systems (IS) literature has investigated them in a separate manner. This study 
contributes to the body of IS knowledge by examining capabilities and governance mechanisms 
influence on outsourcing performance independently and jointly.  
Based on resource-based theory, transaction cost economics, and relational exchange 
theories,  we develop a research model to examine the independent and joint effects of one client's 
capabilities (i.e., client's provider management capability), three provider's capabilities (i.e., human 
resources management, risk management, and innovativeness), and two governance mechanisms 
(contractual and relational governance) on two indicators of outsourcing performance (i.e., 
provider's service quality, and client's economic benefits). Survey data gathered from 306 
practitioners in 21 client firms and 20 provider firms is used to test the research model.  
Our results indicate that service quality and client’s economic benefits have different sets 
of determinants. Service quality is determined by three provider's capabilities and relational 
governance. Client’s economic benefits are determined by contractual and relational governance, 
client's provider management capability, and provider’s service quality. Our findings also provides 
evidence that service quality fully mediates the relationships among three provider's capabilities 
and outsourcing performance. Further, our analyses suggest that there are negative interaction 
effects between capabilities and governance mechanisms on outsourcing performance. More 
specifically, in the presence of strong governance mechanisms, the positive effects of client's and 
provider's capabilities on outsourcing performance are reduced. Last, we also reveal that clients 
and providers differ in how they view the independent and joint effects of capabilities and 
governance mechanisms on outsourcing performance. This study provides some important 
 
 
implications for researchers and practitioners pertaining to effective governance of outsourcing 
arrangements and offers directions for future research.   
Keywords: Outsourcing, Capabilities, Governance Mechanisms, Performance, Client Perspective, 
and Provider Perspective 
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Chapter One 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  
1.1 Background 
 After the 'Kodak effect' in 1989 (Applegate and Montealegre 1991), the trend toward 
outsourcing of information technology and business processes has continued growing 
internationally for more than 20 years (Lacity et al. 2011a). The worldwide information technology 
outsourcing (ITO) market was predicted to grow by 5.5% in 2014 (Gartner 2014), and the global 
business process outsourcing (BPO) market was estimated a compound annual growth rate of 5.6% 
from 2012 through 2017 and a growth of 6.2% in 2014 (Gartner 2013). As the ITO and BPO 
markets have matured, outsourcing performance success rates have improved over time (Lacity et 
al. 2010; 2011a).  In addition, recent studies are finding that some providers are delivering 
innovations that dramatically improve the client firm’s service performance (Lacity and Willcocks 
2013; Oshri et al. 2012).  Despite the growth and growing maturity of the ITO and BPO market, 
good outsourcing performance is not guaranteed. Both clients and providers need to have good 
capabilities and sound governance, or poor performance may occur. Consider, for example, one 
industry survey conducted by InformationWeek finds that only 50% of software development 
outsourcing projects are successful (Gefen et al. 2008). Similarly, a survey conducted by Bain 
Consulting regarding BPO claims that nearly 50% of the large US client firms say that their 
offshoring projects fall short of expectations (Mani et al. 2012).  Some client firms reverse sourcing 
decisions by bringing the IT functions or business processes back in-house. For example, in 2012, 
General Motor (GM) moved 90 percent of its outsourced IT functions that had been managed by 
Hewlett-Packard (HP) back in-house (Savitz 2012). Therefore, academics and practitioners remain 
interested in the management practices that are necessary for a successful outsourcing arrangement 
(e.g., Cao et al. 2014; Goo et al. 2009; Sia et al. 2008; Willcocks et al. 2013). 
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1.2. Problem Statement 
 The existing literature has identified a set of determinants that are positively associated 
with outsourcing performance (e.g., Lacity et al. 2009; Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity et al. 2011a, b), 
including client firm capabilities, provider firm capabilities, contractual governance, relational 
governance, and transaction attributes. However, the empirical results of their impacts on ITO and 
BPO performance are mixed (Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity et al. 2011a). In addition, IS researchers 
frequently ignore the interaction effects (Karimi-Alaghehband et al. 2011; Lacity et al. 2011b), 
especially the interactions between firm capabilities and governance mechanisms. According to 
Resources-based View, firm’s capabilities are resources of sustainable competitive advantage 
(Barney 1991; 2001). When applying in outsourcing circumstance, client and provider capabilities 
are strategic resources of a sustainable outsourcing relationship and of a successful arrangement.  
 Also, contractual governance and relational governance have been underlined as critical 
skills to manage inter-organizational relationships (Goo et al. 2009; Poppo and Zenger 2002). 
Contractual governance refers to governance of an outsourcing arrangement using a formal written 
contract which specifies obligations or promises to perform particular actions to achieve expected 
objectives in the future (Macneil 1978; Poppo and Zenger 2002). Relational governance refers to 
governance of an outsourcing arrangement through social processes that promote trust, information 
exchange, knowledge sharing, and harmonious conflict resolution (e.g., Goo et al. 2009; Poppo and 
Zenger 2002). The extant literature has illustrated that contractual governance and relational 
governance are critical to outsourcing performance (e.g., Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity et al. 2011a). 
Since both capabilities and governance mechanisms are important for outsourcing performance, it 
is essential to understand how to effectively manage specific capabilities with governance 
mechanisms in order to produce better service quality and generate greater client's economic 
benefits.  
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 However, while past research has elaborated on the impacts of client and provider 
capabilities and governance mechanisms, they have been examined in a separate manner (Bardhan 
et al. 2007; Borman 2006; Goo et al. 2007; Levina and Ross 2003; Rao et al. 2006; Rottman and 
Lacity 2004; Sen and Shiel 2006). The understanding of how capabilities interact with governance 
mechanisms in specific contexts to affect critical outcomes is very limited (e.g., Parmigiani and 
Mitchell 2010). Moreover, most of the published studies on the ongoing client-provider 
relationships adopt a client perspective (e.g., Feeny and Willcocks 1998; Kishore et al. 2003; Lin 
et al. 2007), de-emphasizing providers. Studies incorporating both client and provider perspectives 
are comparatively rare (e.g., Sabherwal 1999; Levina and Ross 2003; Koh et al. 2004), given the 
fact that an outsourcing relationship involves actions from both sides.  
 
Figure 1: Simplified Research Model 
 
1.3 Purpose of the Study 
As depicted in the simplified research model in Figure 1, the purpose of this study is to advance 
our understanding of the relationships among client's provider management capability, provider 
capabilities, contractual governance, relational governance, and outsourcing performance by 
addressing the following three research questions: 
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1. What are the main effects of client and provider capabilities as well as governance 
mechanisms on outsourcing performance?  
2. As far as affecting outsourcing performance, are there any interaction effects between 
capabilities and governance mechanisms?  
3.  Are the above relationships contingent on the stakeholder perspective -- client or provider? 
Addressing the above research questions requires access to paired responses from senior level 
informants. We are fortunate to have access to a data set collected by the International Association 
of Outsourcing Practitioners (IAOP) and a consulting company Global Sourcing Optimization 
Services (GSOS) between 2009 and 2012.  The IAOP and GSOS developed a commercial software 
named Value Health Check Survey (VHCS) for outsourcing clients and providers to self-evaluate 
the health of their ongoing outsourcing relationships.  One benefit of using this dataset is that the 
IAOP and GSOS obtained responses from senior level informants about the determinants and 
performance of a particular outsourcing relationship from both client and provider informants.  All 
informants were highly motivated to answer the questions because the client and/or provider 
requested that the Value Health Check Survey be administered.  In addition, each construct is 
measured with multiple items and informants could support each survey item with free-form 
comments, providing evidence for good reliability and validity of data. In total, we have 306 
informants, with 174 from client informants and 132 from provider informants on their ITO and 
BPO relationships. Fortuitously, the survey has items that measure our target constructs (client and 
provider capabilities, contractual and relational governance, and outsourcing performance). The 
drawback of using this survey data is that we are limited to analyzing the items in the survey.  The 
survey allows us to examine the main and interaction effects of one client capability (the ability of 
clients to manage providers), three provider capabilities (human resources management, risk 
management, and innovativeness), contractual governance, and relational governance on two 
indicators of outsourcing performance, namely service quality and economic benefits realization.   
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 This study examines these questions in outsourcing arrangements after clients have already 
selected providers and arrangements are already underway. In particular, this study investigates: (1) 
the main effects of the most important client's capability - capability to manage providers, and three 
provider's capabilities -- human resources management, risk management, and innovativeness, on 
the outsourcing performance – provider’s service quality and client’s economic benefits; (2) the 
main effects of contractual governance and relational governance; (3) the interaction effects 
between capabilities and governance mechanisms; and (4) whether the above relationships are 
viewed differently by clients and providers.  
 
1.4 Relevance of the Research 
 This study contributes to information systems (IS) literature in the following four aspects. 
First, this study expands understanding of client capabilities, provider capabilities, and governance 
mechanisms in ITO and BPO (Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity et al. 2011a). Lacity et al. (2010) and 
Lacity et al. (2011a) conduct literature reviews in ITO and BPO respectively. They find that even 
though prior literature has examined a variety of client capabilities and provider capabilities, only 
few of them have been repeatedly tested in the empirical studies. Second, this study develops a 
comprehensive research model to investigate four key determinants of outsourcing performance. 
Very limited work has examined them together. This study aims to provide a holistic understanding 
of outsourcing performance. Will the effects of capabilities change when taking governance 
mechanisms into consideration and vice versa? Third, this study explores the interactions between 
capabilities and governance mechanisms, which only received little recognition in the extant 
literature (e.g., Parmigiani and Mitchell 2010). Fourth, this study fills the gap of lacking of 
comparative studies in IS literature (Dibbern et al. 2004). This study examines the research model 
from both client and provider perspectives.  
 The rest of paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review related research in 
ITO and BPO on client capabilities, provider capabilities, governance mechanisms, and 
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outsourcing performance. We then present the research model and hypotheses. Next, we discuss 
the research design. Then we present the data analysis results of measurement model and structural 
model. Subsequently, we discuss contributions of this study. The paper concludes with the 
limitations of this study and some directions for future research.  
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Chapter Two 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 We first review major studies in ITO and BPO focusing on the determinants of outsourcing 
performance. Among this set of studies, five categories of factors have emerged as the common 
factors affecting outsourcing performance, including client firm capabilities, provider firm 
capabilities, relational governance, contractual governance, and country characteristics (Lacity 
et al. 2010; Lacity et al. 2011a). In this study, we investigate outsourcing arrangements at the level 
of the individual’s assessment of the outsourcing relationship. Since the country characteristics 
such as cultural distance look more at the country level, we don't include it as an independent 
variable in this study. 
 
2.1 Theoretical Foundation 
 Three theoretical perspectives based on resource-based theory, transaction cost economics, 
and relational exchange theories provide insights to understand the determinants of outsourcing 
performance. These three theories are discussed briefly in the following paragraphs. 
2.1.1 Resource-based Theory 
 Resource-based View posits that resources and capabilities are essential sources of 
sustainable competitive advantage for firms (Barney 1991; Barney et al. 2011; Dyer and Singh 
1998; Grant 1991, 1996; Penrose 1959). Barney et al. (2011) define resources and capabilities as 
"bundles of tangible and intangible assets, including a firm's management skills, its organizational 
processes and routines, and the information and knowledge it controls that can be used by firms to 
help choose and implement strategies" (Barney et al. 2011, p.1300). Twenty more years after the 
article of Barney (1991), RBV has become mature and evolved as a theory rather than just a view. 
It has evolved to one of the most prominent and established theories to describe, explain, and predict 
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organizational relationships (Barney et al. 2011). However, it has often been criticized on two basic 
points: (1) its inward view, and (2) its assumption of firm as an independent entity (Barney et al. 
2011; Wang and Ahmed 2007). Because Resource-based Theory (RBT) has the limitation to 
understand the competitive advantage generated by the inter-firm relationships (Hunt and Davis 
2012; Lavie 2006; Wang and Ahmed 2007), scholars in operation management and strategic 
management have argued that there is a necessity to extend the resource-based view by 
incorporating both internal and external resources to explain and understand the strategic behavior 
and performance of inter-connected firms (Arya and Lin 2007; Dyer and Singh 1998; Lavie 2006; 
Squire and Cousins 2006). For example, Dyer and Singh (1998) argue that complementary 
capabilities from inter-connected firms are sources of inter-organizational competitive advantage. 
A dyad outsourcing arrangement comprises a series of interrelated activities between a client firm 
and a provider firm (Grover et al. 1996; Mani et al. 2010). Therefore, scholars in outsourcing 
research have applied an extended view of RBT - Capability-based view, to describe and explain 
outsourcing relationship (e.g., Feeny and Willcocks 1998; Koh et al. 2004; Lacity et al. 2010; 
Ranganathan and Balaji 2007). Capability-based View emphasizes the important role of client 
capabilities and provider capabilities in achieving outsourcing success.  
 Moreover, in recent years, scholars in strategic management have argued that RBT should 
be linked with other theoretical perspectives to understand and explain inter-firm arrangement's 
performance (e.g., Makadok 2011). Makadok (2011) examines influential factors of firm profit. He 
argues that firm’s internal resources and capabilities are not the only causal mechanisms of firm 
profit and other external sources should also be considered such as commitment timing and 
information asymmetry. Further, except examining main effects of the influential factors, 
interaction effects of them should also be explored. Therefore, in this study, we interlink client and 
provider capabilities with governance mechanisms to examine their main effects and explore their 
interaction effects on outsourcing performance.  
2.1.2 Transaction Cost Economics 
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 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) is one of the most prominent theories utilized to 
explain the choice of governance mode for transaction-based exchanges (Williamson 1975; 1981). 
According to TCE, when firms engage in outsourcing arrangements, as a consequence of exchange 
hazards such as uncertainty and measurement difficulty, they protect their investments from the 
other party's opportunistic behaviors by defining all the possible contingencies in contracts (Kim 
2008). Transaction costs vary with the type of contract adapted (Poppo and Zenger 2002). The more 
complex and larger a contract is, the greater is the specification of contract terms, including 
obligations, communication mechanisms, rewards and penalties, and conflict resolution 
mechanisms (Goo et al. 2009; Poppo and Zenger 2002). However, the cost of creating a complex 
contract is high. Firms accept such a high cost only when the impacts of breaching a contract is 
substantial (Poppo and Zenger 2002). Therefore, contractual governance has been identified as one 
of the major determinants of outsourcing performance (Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity et al. 2011a, b). 
Clients and providers in an outsourcing arrangement have to design their contract precisely and 
completely in order to achieve optimal outsourcing performance. 
2.1.3 Relational Exchange Theories 
 In spite of the importance and value of a formal contract, many scholars have observed that 
a formal contract alone is insufficient to manage an outsourcing arrangement. First, it is impossible 
for firms to identify all the possible contingencies at one time because of bounded rationality of 
human beings (Simon 1991). Second, the technologies as well as business and organizational 
environment of outsourcing arrangements are dynamic and changing (Goo et al. 2009; Kern and 
Willcocks 2000; Koh et al. 2004; Levina and Su 2008; Poppo and Zenger 2002; Rai et al. 2012). 
Therefore, outsourcing arrangements are complex and involve a variety of uncertainties. 
  Outsourcing arrangements are inter-organizational exchanges embedded in social 
relationships (Poppo and Zenger 2002). According to relational exchange theory (Macneil 1978; 
1980) and social exchange theory (Blau 1964; Emerson 1972; Homans 1974), inter-organizational 
exchanges generally include some relational elements. Relational exchange theory posits that 
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contracting is never completely written (Macneil 1980) and relational exchange can improve the 
performance of inter-organizational exchange. Social exchange theory (Blau 1964) argues that 
exchange relationships are dynamic. They evolve as the participating actors mutually and 
sequentially demonstrate their trustworthiness and carry out activities toward one another. 
Therefore, given the dynamic nature of inter-organizational exchange, relational governance which 
promotes mutual trust and effective communication is critical to outsourcing performance. Many 
prior studies have demonstrated that relational governance improves the outsourcing performance 
(e.g., Poppo and Zenger 2002; Sabherwal 1999). For example, Poppo and Zenger (2002) find that 
relational governance which matches transaction attributes is significantly and positively associated 
with better outsourcing performance. Sabherwal (1999) discusses the role of trust in outsourcing 
projects and finds that trust along with appropriate controls can generate good quality and timely 
progress. 
 
2.2 Client's Capability to Manage Providers 
 A capability is defined as "a distinctive set of human-based skills, orientations, attitudes, 
motivations, and behaviors that, when applied, can transform resources into specific activities" 
(Willcocks et al. 2007, p.129). In an outsourcing arrangement, a client firm cannot simply hand 
over responsibilities to a provider. Rather, a client firm needs to retain necessary capabilities or 
even develop a new set of capabilities when outsourcing (Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity et al. 2011a, b; 
Willcocks et al. 2007). Prior studies have identified a range of client capabilities that influence 
outsourcing performance (Feeny and Willcocks 1998; Koh et al. 2004; Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity et 
al. 2011a; Willcocks et al. 2007). For example, Feeny and Willcocks (1998) identify nine core 
capabilities from client’s perspective that clients should have to manage ITO, including capabilities 
of business systems thinking, relationship management, architecture planning, leadership, informed 
buying, making technology work, contract facilitation, provider management, and contract 
monitoring. Koh et al. (2004) examine desired client capabilities from provider’s perspective. They 
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find that providers expect clients to have capabilities of specifying requirements clearly, paying 
fees promptly, monitoring project closely, sharing knowledge effectively, managing project with 
ownership, and staffing project delicately. 
 Among these identified client’s capabilities, client's provider management capability has 
been deemed as the most important factor that influences ITO and BPO performance (Lacity et al. 
2010, Lacity et al. 2011a). Client's provider management capability is defined as a client firm's 
ability to manage outsourcing relationships with providers effectively. This is a high-level construct, 
including components of a client’s ability to manage outsourcing relationship with experienced 
people, effective processes, tools, and technologies (Lacity et. al 2011a; Howells et al., 2008; 
Ranganathan and Balaji 2007; Willcocks et al. 2007). Table 1 summarizes previous studies that 
empirically investigate the relationship between client's provider management capability and 
outsourcing performance. 
 As shown in Table 1, eleven studies in ITO and five studies in BPO have empirically tested 
the impact of client's provider management capability on a variety of outsourcing outcomes such 
as satisfaction (e.g., Sanders et al. 2007), cost savings realization (e.g., Cross 1995; Willcocks et 
al. 2007), service quality (e.g., Lewin and Peeters 2006; Tayntor 1997), and business value 
realization (e.g., Atesci et al. 2010; Kim and Chung 2003). All the 16 studies indicate that client's 
provider management capability has a significant and positive impact on the outsourcing 
performance.  
 However, there are two limitations in the prior literature. The first is that researchers mainly 
focused on the client’s perspective, with 12 out of 15 papers investigating the impact of client's 
provider management capability from client’s perspective. Only one study has looked at the 
provider side (Atesci et al. 2010). Atesci et al. (2010) conduct a case study with one of the India's 
largest outsourcing providers, Satyam Computer Services, and draw attention to a fact that 
outsourcing arrangements can pose risks for client organizations. Therefore, clients can't just sit 
back and enjoy the ride. Rather, they have to exercise some controls over their outsourcing 
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arrangements such as managing risks and contingencies associated with outsourcing arrangements 
in order to secure expected outcomes.  
 Another limitation is that prior literature has mainly adopted qualitative research 
approaches such as case study or interviews (e.g., Michell and Fitzgerald 1997; Sanders et al. 2007; 
Willcocks et al. 2007). For example, Willcocks e al. (2007) present three case studies: 
Commonwealth Bank Australia, DuPont, and State super Financial Services, to demonstrate how 
clients can evolve their core IS capabilities to exploit IT and improve firm performance. Very 
limited work in the prior literature has developed survey instruments to measure client's provider 
management capability (e.g., Kim and Chung 2003). Kim and Chung (2003) use four items to 
measure client's monitoring of the provider. They find that monitoring of the provider is positively 
associated with economic and non-economic benefits. 
 Overall, client's provider management capability has been found to positively influence 
outsourcing performance in the prior literature. However, there is a need to conduct more 
quantitative studies and more research from the provider side. 
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Table 1:  Impacts of Client's Provider Management Capability  
on Outsourcing Performance in Prior Literature 
# 
Author and 
Year 
Measurement of 
Outsourcing Performance 
Effect View 
Sourcing 
Type 
Research 
Method 
Theoretical 
Foundation 
1 Cross (1995) 
(1) Cost reduction, (2) 
improved service, (3) access to 
new ideas and advanced 
technologies 
+ Client ITO 
Case 
Study 
Agency 
theory 
2 Tayntor (1997) 
(1) Cost efficiency, (2) 
meeting SLA 
+ Client ITO 
Case 
Study 
Not 
Specified 
3 
Michell and 
Fitzgerald 
(1997) 
Generic perception of 
outsourcing success 
+ Client ITO 
Interviews
, Survey 
Agency 
theory 
4 Currie (1998) Risk Mitigation + Client ITO 
Case 
Study 
Agency 
theory 
5 
Feeny and 
Willcocks 
(1998) 
Generic perception of 
outsourcing success 
+ Client ITO 
Case 
Study 
Resource-
based View 
6 Quinn (1999) 
(1) flexibility, (2) innovation, 
(3) shareholder value 
+ Client ITO 
Case 
Study 
Resource-
based View 
7 
Al-Qirim 
(2003) 
Generic perception of 
outsourcing success 
+ Client ITO 
Interviews
, Survey 
Not 
Specified 
8 
Kim and Chung 
(2003) 
(1) satisfaction, (2) perceived 
strategic, economic, and 
technological benefits 
+ Client ITO Survey 
Relational 
exchange 
theory 
9 
Ranganathan 
and Balaji 
(2007) 
(1) cost savings realized, (2) 
benefits realized, (3) 
satisfaction, and (4) project 
performance 
+ Client ITO 
Case 
Study 
Capabilities 
thinking 
approach 
10 
Willcocks et al. 
(2007) 
(1) cost savings realized, (2) 
business performance 
improvement 
+ Client ITO 
Case 
Study 
Resource-
based View 
11 
Iacovou and 
Nakatsu (2008) 
Generic perception of 
outsourcing success 
+ Client ITO 
Delphi-
Survey 
Agency 
theory 
12 
Willcocks et al. 
(2004) 
Effective knowledge sharing + Both BPO 
Case 
Study 
Not 
Specified 
13 
Lewin and 
Peeters (2006) 
(1) Cost savings, (2) meeting 
SLA 
+ Client BPO Survey 
Not 
Specified 
14 
Sanders et al. 
(2007) 
Satisfaction + Client BPO Interviews 
Resource-
based View 
15 
Saxena and 
Bharadwaj 
(2009) 
(1) Client's perspective: cost 
efficiency, new business 
competencies, and opportunity 
for business transformation; 
and (2) provider's perspective: 
business growth, longer 
customer retention, and new 
value adding services 
+ Both BPO 
Case 
Study 
Agency 
Theory, 
TCE, RBV, 
Relationship 
Theories 
16 
Atesci et al. 
(2010) 
Operational, financial, and 
strategic benefits 
+ 
Provi
der 
BPO 
Case 
Study 
Not 
Specified 
The symbol "+" indicates that client's provider management capability is positively associated with outsourcing outcomes. 
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2.3 Provider’s Capabilities 
 Clients seek for better services with advanced skills, expertise, and capabilities in 
outsourcing (e.g., Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity et al. 2011a, b; Fersht et al. 2011). Therefore, 
outsourcing performance highly depends on provider’s capabilities. A wide range of provider 
capabilities have been examined in the literature (Feeny et al. 2005; Koh et al. 2004; Lacity et al. 
2010; Lacity et al. 2011a; Rajeev and Vani 2009; Taylor 2006). For example, Feeny et al. (2005) 
identify 12 core provider capabilities that significantly impact outsourcing performance from 
client’s perspective, including domain understanding of client's business, business management 
capability, behavior management capability, sourcing capability, technology exploitation 
capability, process re-engineering capability, customer development capability, planning and 
contracting capability, organization design capability, governance capability, program 
management capability, and leadership. Likewise, investigating from client’s side, Koh et al. (2004) 
identify six provider’s capabilities that are critical to ITO performance, including capabilities of 
effective human resources management, effective knowledge sharing and transfer, effective inter-
firm team management, clear authority structures defining, accurate project scoping, and taking 
charge. From provider's perspective, Rajeev and Vani (2009) find that three provider’s capabilities 
are important to BPO performance, including client management capability, human resource 
management capability, and IS technical and methodological capability; and Taylor (2006) 
determines three provider’s capabilities affecting IT outsourcing satisfaction, which are effective 
project staffing, managing client expectations, and risk management capability. 
 Even though the prior literature has identified a set of provider capabilities significantly 
influencing outsourcing performance, only a small number of them have been replicated enough 
(Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity et al. 2011a). Lacity et al. (2010) review literature in ITO and reveal that 
only three provider capabilities have been investigated more than five times in ITO studies, which 
are provider's human resource management capability, provider's technical and methodological 
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capability, and domain understanding. Similarly, Lacity et al. (2011a) conduct an intensive 
literature review of BPO studies and find that only one provider capability, i.e., provider's human 
resource management capability, has been examined more than 5 times in BPO studies.  
 This study investigates two provider's capabilities that have been continually emphasized 
in the literature: human resources management capability (e.g., Beulen and Ribbers 2003; Lacity 
et al. 2004) and risk management capability (e.g., Taylor 2006, 2007), as well as one provider's 
capability that has recently emerged in outsourcing studies: innovativeness (e.g., Lacity and 
Willcocks 2013; Willcocks et al. 2013).   
2.3.1 Provider's Human Resources Management Capability 
 Provider's human resources management capability is defined as a provider's ability to 
identify, recruit, train, deploy, and retain effective human capital in order to achieve expected 
outsourcing outcomes (Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity et al. 2011a). Table 2 summarizes previous studies 
that focus on the impact of provider's human resources management capability on outsourcing 
performance. 
 As shown in Table 2, the majority of empirical studies find a positive relationship between 
provider's human resource management capability and outsourcing performance such as improving 
satisfaction, reducing costs,  improving service quality, and increasing industry growth (e.g., Koh 
et al. 2004; Lacity et al. 2004; Levina and Ross 2003; Kuruvilla and Ranganathan 2010). Among 
these studies, Levina and Ross (2003) conduct a case study with paired client and provider firm in 
ITO and find that provider's staffing decisions such as hiring, training, assignment rules, promotion 
rules, employee satisfaction and turnover, significantly affect client's satisfaction; Lacity et al. 
(2004) conduct a case study of back-office transformation with senior managers from Lloyds (client) 
and Xchanging (provider) and find that provider's capability to retrain, empower, and motivate 
transferred employees can result in better outsourcing performance such as more cost savings, 
better service quality, and more shared revenue. Only one study (i.e., Gopal et al. 2003) finds no 
relationship between provider's human resource management capability and outsourcing 
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performance. Gopal et al. (2003) study the determinants of contract choice (time-and-material 
contract versus fixed-price contract) in offshore software development projects. Based on the data 
of 93 offshore projects from a leading Indian software provider, they provide evidence that 
provider's human resources capability has impact on client's contract choice, but not on provider's 
profitability.  
 
 
The symbol "+" indicates that provider's human resources management capability is positively associated with outsourcing outcomes. 
 
Table 2: Impacts of Provider's Human Resources Management Capability  
on Outsourcing Performance in Prior Literature 
# 
Author and 
Year 
Measurement of 
Outsourcing 
Performance 
Effect View Type 
Research 
Method 
Theoretical 
Foundation 
1 
Beulen and 
Ribbers (2003) 
Business 
improvement 
+ Both ITO 
Case 
Study 
Hofstede's culture 
framework 
2 
Levina and 
Ross (2003) 
Satisfaction + Both ITO 
Case 
Study 
Complementarity in 
organizational design 
3 
Gopal et al. 
(2003) 
Provider's 
profitability 
0 Provider ITO Survey  
TCE, Incomplete 
Contract Theory, 
Power Theory 
4 
Koh et al. 
(2004) 
(1) satisfaction, and 
(2) intention to 
continue the 
outsourcing 
relationship 
+ Both ITO 
Survey, 
Interview 
Physiological 
Contract Theory 
5 
Rao et al. 
(2006) 
(1) cost savings 
realized, and (2) 
service quality 
+ Client ITO Interviews Not specified 
6 Taylor (2006) Satisfaction + Provider ITO Interviews Not specified 
7 
Oshri et al. 
(2007) 
Service quality + Provider ITO 
Case 
Study 
Knowledge-based 
view 
8 
Remus and 
Wiener (2009) 
Generic perception of 
outsourcing success 
+ Both ITO 
Case 
Study 
Not specified 
9 
Lacity et al. 
(2004) 
(1) cost reduction, (2) 
better service quality, 
(3) shared revenue 
+ Client BPO 
Case 
Study 
TCE, RBV 
10 
Lahiri and 
Kedia (2009) 
(1) Organizational 
business 
performance, and (2) 
relationship quality 
+ Provider BPO Survey 
Resource-based 
View; social 
exchange theory 
11 
Rajeev and 
Vani (2009) 
Organizational 
business performance 
+ Provider BPO 
Field 
Survey 
TCE 
12 
Kuruvilla and 
Ranganathan 
(2010) 
Industry growth + Provider BPO 
Case 
Study 
Not specified 
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Although these studies have greatly enhanced our understanding of provider's human 
resources management capability, there are some limitations. One limitation is that most studies 
employed qualitative approaches, only a small number of papers have investigated it quantitatively 
(e.g., Koh et al. 2004). For example, Koh et al. (2004) apply the concept of psychological contract 
to study ITO success from both client’s and provider’s perspectives. They assess the impacts of six 
provider's capabilities through a field study of 370 managers. Their results indicate that provider's 
human resources management such as assigning experienced employees to work on the project and 
minimizing employee turnover during the project is positively associated with perceived ITO 
success. Another limitation is that only a limited number of studies have looked at the role of 
provider's human resource management capability in BPO (e.g., Kuruvilla and Ranganathan 2010; 
Lahiri and Kedia 2009), in particular in the main IS journals. 
2.3.2 Provider's Risk Management Capability 
 In this study, we define provider's risk management capability as a provider's ability to 
identify, rate, rank, and mitigate potential outsourcing risks for the purpose to minimize the chance 
of their negative impacts (Lacity et al. 2011a). Examples of provider’s risk management capability 
include protecting client's intellectual property and having contingency plans in place. Outsourcing 
arrangements involve a variety of risks (Iacovou and Nakatsu 2008; Kern et al. 2002), such as 
unrealistic client expectations, lack of outsourcing experience from client side, lack of cooperation, 
poor control, data and system insecurity, and legal/political uncertainties. Prior literature has 
frequently stressed the importance of client's risk management in outsourcing (Adeleye et al. 2004; 
Kern et al. 2002; Lin et al. 2007; Rottman and Lacity 2004; Smith and McKeen 2004). Although 
provider's risk management has been demonstrated as an influential factor to ITO (Taylor 2006; 
Taylor 2007) and BPO performance (Lacity et al. 2011a; Narayanan et al. 2011), research on it has 
been limited and mainly qualitative, as shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Impacts of Provider's Risk Management Capability  
on Outsourcing Performance in Prior Literature 
# 
Author 
and Year 
Measurement of 
Outsourcing 
Performance 
Effect Perspective 
Sourcing 
Type 
Research 
Method 
Theoretical 
Foundation 
1 
Taylor 
(2006) 
Satisfaction + Provider ITO Interviews 
Agency 
theory 
2 
Taylor 
(2007) 
(1) project level 
performance; (2) 
satisfactory process, 
and (3) business 
growth opportunity 
+ Provider ITO Interviews 
Agency 
theory 
3 
Sen and 
Shiel 
(2006) 
Relationship quality + Both BPO 
Case 
Studies 
Not 
Specified 
4 
Narayanan 
et al. 
(2011) 
(1) profit level, (2) 
market share, and 
(3) cost reduction 
0 Provider BPO Survey 
Information 
processing 
theory 
The symbol "+" indicates that provider's risk management capability is positively associated with outsourcing outcomes. 
 Among the limited work on provider's risk management capability, Taylor (2007) 
interviews 22 experienced project managers from provider firms and finds that provider's risk 
management capability in ITO is positively associated with outsourcing success in terms of better 
project performance, satisfactory process, and more business growth opportunity. Similarly, Sen 
and Shiel (2006) conduct five case studies in India and Ireland about knowledge processes 
outsourcing from client’s and provider’s perspectives. They posit that even though knowledge 
processes outsourcing is more profitable to providers, it is fraught with new risks. Therefore, 
providers need to have strong risk management capability in place. Further, Narayanan et al. (2011) 
use survey data gathered from 205 Indian BPO providers to analyze the impact of provider's risk 
management capability on BPO performance. They find that it has positive impact on the 
outsourcing performance, but not significantly. Thus, prior literature has revealed mixed results on 
the link between provider risk management capability and outsourcing performance. One purpose 
of this study is to provide further understanding of this relationship. 
2.3.3 Provider's Innovativeness 
 Although provider's innovativeness has been repetitively examined in operation 
management (Azadegan et al. 2008; Baptista 1996; Choi and Krause 2006; Merrifield 1989; 
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Wallenburg 2009), it just received recognition from outsourcing researchers in recent years (e.g., 
Lacity and Willcocks 2013; Willcocks et al. 2013). Innovations can take the form of new products, 
new or improved processes, new markets, and new tools/technologies, any of which may affect the 
performance of outsourcing (Lacity and Willcocks 2013). Providers do not need incentives from 
clients to create innovations for the purpose of improving their profits. Yet they do need 
motivations to deliver innovations that improve client firm's performance (Lacity and Willcocks 
2013). Providers may be incentivized by using mechanisms such as revenue sharing at the project 
level, innovation days, and mandatory productivity targets (Lacity and Willcocks 2013; Lacity and 
Willcocks 2014). However, innovation may not happen unless clients and providers have a more 
comprehensive process for combining acculturation across different organizations, idea generation, 
and funding support. Therefore, to achieve innovations in outsourcing, providers not only need to 
have incentives but also proper governance mechanisms in place. In this study, we refer to the 
capability of the provider to create innovations which may deliver continuous improvements to 
client firm's performance as provider innovativeness (Azadegan et al. 2008; Lacity and Willcocks 
2013). As an emerging term in outsourcing, provider's innovativeness has not received adequate 
attention, as shown in Table 4. 
Table 4: Impacts of Provider's Innovativeness on Outsourcing Performance in Prior 
Literature 
# 
Author and 
Year 
Measurement of 
Outsourcing 
Performance 
Effec
t 
Perspecti
ve 
Sourcin
g Type 
Researc
h 
Method 
Theoretical 
Foundation 
1 
Lacity and 
Willcocks 
(2013) 
Innovations + Both BPO 
Survey 
and 
interview
s 
Partnership 
View 
2 
Willcocks et al. 
(2013) 
(1) cost savings, 
(2) service 
improvement, (3) 
new capabilities 
+ Both ITO 
Case 
study 
Partnership 
View 
The symbol "+" indicates that provider's risk management capability is positively associated with outsourcing outcomes. 
 Among the two empirical studies, Lacity and Willcocks (2013) survey 202 outsourcing 
professionals and conduct 38 in-depth interviews with executives at client and provider firms to 
study BPO relationships. They reveal that clients who achieve outsourcing success concentrate less 
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on operational efficiency (e.g., cost savings or access skills) and more on achieving innovations. In 
high performing BPO, providers carry out a series of innovation projects to continuously improve 
client's operating efficiency and strategic performance, as well as ensure business-process 
effectiveness. Willcocks et al. (2013) study a 10-year enterprise partnership and find that provider's 
innovativeness such as sharing revenues with client can help provider expand its market services 
and increase its revenue growth. As evidenced in Table 4, although provider's innovativeness is 
crucial to outsourcing performance, it has not received adequate attention in IS, neither have survey 
instruments been developed to measure it. 
 
2.4 Contractual Governance 
 In accordance with the logic of transaction cost economics (TCE) (Williamson 1975; 1981), 
in response to exchange hazards (e.g., asset specificity, measurement difficulty, uncertainties, 
bounded rationality), firms either implement complex contracts or opt for vertically integration 
when the cost of crafting detailed contracts is high (Goo et al. 2009; Poppo and Zenger 2002). 
Therefore, in an outsourcing arrangement, one task of client is to craft governance arrangements, 
which match exchange conditions and ensure the achievement of the desired goals (Poppo and 
Zenger 2002). One of the commonly used governance mechanisms is a formal contract. A formal 
contract represents obligations or promises to carry out specific actions in outsourcing 
arrangements (Macneil 1978; Poppo and Zenger 2002). It can act as safeguard to minimize 
transaction costs and help firms form initial institutional trust (Goo et al. 2009; McKnight et al. 
1998; Zucker 1986). Reviewing the extant literature, a plethora of studies, as summarized in Table 
5, have empirically examined the impact of contractual governance factors on outsourcing 
performance (Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; Gopal et al. 2003; Lacity et al. 1995; McFarlan and 
Nolan 1995; Sanders et al. 1997; Rottman and Lacity 2004; Rai et al. 2012; Kim et al. 2013). 
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Table 5: Impacts of Contractual Governance Factors  
on Outsourcing Performance in Prior Literature 
# Author and Year 
Contract 
Governance 
Outsourcing 
Outcomes 
Sourcing 
Type Method View Sample 
1 
Lacity and 
Hirschheim (1993) 
Customized 
Contract (+) 
Satisfaction ITO 
Case 
Studies 
Client 
14 Fortune 
500 
companies 
2 
Richmond and 
Seidmann (1993) 
Contract 
Structure (M) 
Business Value 
Realization 
ITO 
Case 
Studies 
Both 
1 client firm 
and 1 
provider 
firm 
3 Lacity et al. (1995) 
Contract Duration 
(-) 
Partnership-base 
Contract (+) 
Cost Savings 
Realized; 
Meeting 
Expectations 
ITO 
Case 
Studies 
Client 
40 
companies 
4 
McFarlan and 
Nolan (1995) 
Partnership-base 
Contract (+) 
Cost Savings 
Realized 
ITO 
Case 
Study 
both 
1 client firm 
and 1 
provider 
firm 
5 
Pinnington and 
Woolcock (1995) 
Contract Detail 
(+) 
Cost Savings 
Realized 
ITO Interviews Client 
12 top 150 
UK firms 
6 
Michell and 
Fitzgerald (1997) 
Contract Detail 
(+) 
Meeting Service 
Level 
ITO 
Interviews
, Survey, 
Case 
Studies 
Both 
Interviews 
with 16 
providers; 
survey with 
150 senior 
managers; 
Case studies 
with 25 
clients 
7 
Sanders et al. 
(1997) 
Contract Detail 
(+) 
Economic, 
technical, 
strategic benefits; 
overall 
satisfaction 
ITO 
Case 
Studies 
Client 34 managers 
8 Currie (1998) 
Contract Duration 
(-) 
Risk Reduction ITO 
Case 
Studies 
Client 
2 client 
firms 
9 
Lacity and 
Willcocks (1998) 
Contract Duration 
(-) 
Contract Recency 
(+) 
Detailed Fee-for-
service contracts 
(+) 
Cost Savings 
Realized 
ITO 
Case 
Studies 
Client 
61 
outsourcing 
decisions 
made in 40 
US and UK 
firms 
10 
Domberger et al. 
(2000) 
Contract Size (+) Service Quality ITO Survey Client 48 contracts 
11 
Baldwin et al. 
(2001) 
Contract Duration 
(-) 
Contract 
Flexibility (+) 
Satisfaction ITO 
Case 
study 
Client 1 UK bank 
12 Barthelemy (2001) 
Contract Detail 
(+) 
Cost Savings 
Realized 
ITO 
Survey 
and 
Interviews 
Client 
50 ITO 
Companies 
13 
Beaumont and 
Costa (2002) 
Contract Detail 
(+) 
Generic 
Outsourcing 
Success- Not 
Specified 
ITO 
Survey, 
interviews 
Client 
277 
informants 
for survey 
and 6 
interviews 
with 
mangers  
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Table 5: Impacts of Contractual Governance Factors  
on Outsourcing Performance in Prior Literature 
# Author and Year 
Contract 
Governance 
Outsourcing 
Outcomes 
Sourcing 
Type Method View Sample 
14 Gopal et al. (2002) 
Contract Type 
(M) 
Project rework ITO Survey Provider 
34 
application 
software 
projects 
15 
Kern and 
Willcocks (2002) 
Contract Detail 
(+) 
Control 
Mechanisms (+) 
Relationship 
Quality 
ITO 
Case 
Studies 
Both 12 firms 
16 Kern et al. (2002) 
Contract 
Flexibility (+) 
Generic 
Outsourcing 
Success- Not 
Specified 
ITO 
Case 
Study 
Client 1 firm 
17 
Poppo and Zenger 
(2002) 
Customized 
Contract (+) 
Satisfaction ITO Survey Client 
285 IS 
executives 
18 
Choudhury and 
Sabherwal (2003) 
Control 
Mechanisms (M) 
Generic 
Outsourcing 
Success- Not 
Specified 
ITO 
Case 
Studies 
Client 5 firms 
19 
Gainey and Klass 
(2003) 
Contract Detail 
(+) 
Client 
Satisfaction 
BPO Survey Client 
157 HR 
directors 
20 Gopal et al. (2003) Contract Size (+) 
Provider 
Profitability 
ITO Survey Provider 
93 offshore 
projects 
22 
Susarla et al. 
(2003) 
Contract Detail 
(0) 
Satisfaction ITO Survey Client 
256 client 
firms 
23 
Khan and 
Fitzgerald (2004) 
Contract Detail 
(+) 
Generic 
Outsourcing 
Success- Not 
Specified 
ITO 
Case 
Studies 
Client 4 firms 
24 Koh et al. (2004) 
Contract Duration 
(0) 
Contract Size (0) 
Satisfaction ITO 
Interview, 
Survey 
Both 
Interviews 
with 9 client 
project 
managers 
and 6 
provider 
project 
managers; 
survey with 
375 
managers 
25 Lee et al. (2004) 
Contract Duration 
(+) 
Cost efficiency; 
strategic 
competence; 
technology 
catalysis 
ITO Survey Client 311 CIOs 
26 
Rottman and 
Lacity (2004) 
fixed-fee contract 
(+) 
Contract size (+) 
Risk Reduction 
Cost Savings 
Realized 
ITO 
Case 
Study 
Client 1 firm 
27 
Smith and McKeen 
(2004) 
Contract Detail 
(+) 
Contract 
Duration(-1) 
Generic 
Outsourcing 
Success- Not 
Specified 
ITO 
Focus 
Group 
Client 1 firm 
28 
Willcocks et al. 
(2004) 
 
Contract Detail 
(-) 
Contract Duration 
(-) 
Business Process 
Improvement 
ITO 
and 
BPO 
Case 
Study 
Client 1 firm 
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Table 5: Impacts of Contractual Governance Factors  
on Outsourcing Performance in Prior Literature 
# Author and Year 
Contract 
Governance 
Outsourcing 
Outcomes 
Sourcing 
Type Method View Sample 
29 Oh et al. (2006) Contract Size (-) 
Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 
ITO 
Event 
Study 
Client 
192 
outsourcing 
announceme
nts 
30 Ross et al. (2006) 
Contract Type 
(M) 
Meeting 
Expectations 
ITO 
Case 
Studies 
Both 
2 client 
firms and 3 
provider 
firms 
31 Lin et al. (2007) 
Contract Detail 
(+) 
Business Value 
Realization 
ITO 
Survey, 
Case 
Studies 
Client 69 CIOs 
32 
Niranjan et al. 
(2007) 
Contract Detail 
(+) 
Generic 
Outsourcing 
Success-Not 
Specified 
BPO 
Case 
Studies 
Provider 4 providers 
33 Alami et al. (2008) 
Contract Detail 
(-) 
Relationship 
Quality 
ITO 
Multiple 
Case 
Studies 
Provider 
6 provider 
firms 
34 Kim (2008) 
Contract Detail 
(+) 
Cost Reduction BPO 
Case 
Study 
Client 1 client firm 
35 
Rottman and 
Lacity (2008) 
Contract Size (+) 
Contract Duration 
(+) 
Contract Recency 
(+) 
Meeting Cost, 
quality, and 
productivity 
objectives 
ITO Interviews Client 
21 IT 
projects in a 
client firm 
36 Sia et al. (2008) 
Contract Type (0) 
Contract Duration 
(0) 
Contract 
Flexibility (+) 
Contract Size (+) 
Satisfaction; 
Perceived 
benefits achieved 
BPO Survey Client 
171 
outsourcing 
projects 
37 
Wüllenweber et al. 
(2008) 
Contract 
Completeness (+) 
BPO Success  BPO Survey Client 
335 BPO 
ventures in 
215 German 
banks 
38 
Bharadwaj and 
Saxena (2009) 
Contract Detail 
(+) 
Client 
Management 
Capability 
BPO Survey Provider 
52 
respondents 
39 
Handley and 
Benton (2009) 
Contract Detail 
(+) 
Meeting 
Expectations 
BPO Survey Client 
198 
procurement 
and sourcing 
professionals 
40 
McIvor et al. 
(2009) 
Contract Detail 
(+) 
Contract 
Flexibility (+) 
Process 
Performance 
Improvement 
BPO 
Case 
Study 
Client 1 firm 
41 
Tate and Ellram 
(2009) 
Contract Detail 
(+) 
Stakeholder Buy-
in (+) 
Efficiency; 
customer 
satisfaction; 
process 
improvements 
BPO 
Case 
Studies 
Client 6 firms 
42 
Balaji and Brown 
(2010) 
Contractual 
Governance (+) 
Contract 
Flexibility (+) 
Execution-level 
Effectiveness 
Economic 
Benefits 
ITO Survey Client 
141 IS 
managers 
43 Luo et al. (2010) 
Contract Detail 
(+) 
Process 
Integration 
BPO 
Case 
Studies 
Provider 2 firms 
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Governance 
Outsourcing 
Outcomes 
Sourcing 
Type Method View Sample 
44 
Fitoussi and 
Gurbaxani (2012) 
Contract Design 
(M) 
Cost Reduction; 
Service Quality 
ITO Survey Client 
42 IS 
Executives 
45 
Gopal and Koka 
(2012) 
Contract Type 
(M) 
Profit; Service 
Quality 
ITO Survey Provider 
105 
contracts in 
a provider 
firm 
46 Mani et al. (2012) 
Contract 
Completeness (0) 
Satisfaction BPO Survey Client 134 firms 
47 
Qi and Chau 
(2012) 
Contract 
complexity (+) 
Contract 
management (+) 
Economic, 
technological, 
and strategic 
benefits 
ITO 
Case 
Studies 
Client 
2 client 
firms 
48 Rai et al. (2012) 
Contractual 
Governance (+) 
Satisfaction BPO Survey Client 
335 BPO 
ventures 
49 Kim et al. (2013) 
Contract 
Specification (+) 
Cost Efficiency; 
Performance 
Improvement; 
Satisfaction 
ITO Survey Client 
143 Client 
Companies 
50 
Langer et al. 
(2013) 
Activity control 
(+) 
Client 
Satisfaction 
ITO Survey Both 
390 strategic 
outsourcing 
contracts 
Capability 
Control (M) 
Formal Contract 
(-) 
Profitability 
*In this column, a sign of "+" indicates a significant and positive relationship between the contractual governance and outsourcing 
outcome(s); a sign of "-" indicates a negative relationship; a sign of "0" indicates no impact; and a sign of "M" indicates that contractual 
governance matters but may have positive/negative/no impact depending on some other factors. 
 As shown in Table 5, the majority of the literature on contractual governance focuses on 
the following contractual factors: level of contract details (e.g., Kim et al. 2013; McIvor et al. 2009), 
contract type (e.g., Gopal et al. 2002; Rottman and Lacity 2004), contract duration (e.g., Koh et al. 
2004; Lacity and Willcocks 1998), contract size (e.g., Oh et al. 2006; Gopal et al. 2003), and 
contract flexibility (e.g., Baldwin et al. 2001; McIvor et al. 2009).  
 Contract detail refers to the extent of comprehensive clauses in an outsourcing contract 
that define service scope, service prices, service levels, measurements of outcomes, and rewards 
and penalties (e.g., Kim et al. 2013; Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity and Willcocks 1998; Poppo and 
Zenger 2002). In general, both ITO and BPO studies have shown that the level of contract details 
is positively associated with outsourcing performance such as satisfaction (e.g., Sanders et al. 1997; 
Tate and Ellram 2009), cost savings realized (e.g., Lacity and Willcocks 1998), and business value 
realization (e.g., Lin et al. 2007). However, some scholars also find that contract details may have 
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negative impact on outsourcing performance (e.g., Alami et al. 2008; Willcocks et al. 2004). For 
example, Alami et al. (2008) find that detailed contract clauses such as harsh penalties may create 
an unhealthy atmosphere in the relationship, which in turn hurts the relationship quality. Willcocks 
et al. (2004) investigate knowledge assimilation, creation, and application in five types of 
outsourcing arrangements and contend that complete and detailed contract may limit knowledge 
creation and use.  
 Contract type is defined as “a term denoting different forms of contracts used in 
outsourcing” (Lacity et al. 2010, p.423). Examples of contract type include “customized, fixed 
priced, time and materials, fee for service, and partnership-based contracts” (Lacity et al. 2010, 
p.423). In ITO, Lacity and Willcocks (1998) find that detailed fee-for-service contracts realize more 
cost savings than standard contracts, loose contracts, and mixed contracts. Gopal et al. (2002) 
compare the offshore software development project rework in two types of contracts: fixed-price 
and time & material. They reveal that fixed-price contracts result in less rework compared to time 
& material contracts, because providers have less flexibility with fixed-price contracts and must 
bear the full burden of any extra costs. Rottman and Lacity (2004) explore the relationship between 
contract type and risk mitigation and find that fixed-fee contracts can reduce the level of 
outsourcing risks for clients. Surprisingly, in BPO, prior studies have not found significant impacts 
of contract type on outsourcing outcomes such as satisfaction and perceived benefits achieved (e.g., 
Sia et al. 2008; Li et al. 2010). 
 Contract duration is also called length of a contract, usually measured by the difference 
between the effective starting date and the expiry date (e.g., Koh et al. 2004; Lacity and Willcocks 
1998; Lacity et al. 2011a). Prior literature has shown that, in general, short-term contracts, which 
are usually three to five years contracts, are more successful in terms of achieving expected cost 
savings (e.g., Lacity and Willcocks 1998), focusing on core competence (e.g., Kim et al. 2013), 
improving client satisfaction (e.g., Baldwin et al. 2001; Koh et al. 2004); and mitigating risks (e.g., 
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Currie 1998). However, when the goals of outsourcing arrangements are technology catalysis or 
innovation, long-term contracts, longer than 5 years, are expected (Lee et al. 2004).  
 Contract size is the total dollar amount of an outsourcing contract (e.g., Oh et al. 2006; 
Koh et al. 2004; Lacity et al. 2010). Contract size represents a proxy of the scope, scale and 
complexity of an outsourcing arrangement (Domberger et al. 2000). The empirical studies have 
mostly shown that larger contracts are more successful in terms of higher provider profitability 
(Gopal et al. 2003), delivering better service quality (Domberger et al. 2000), increasing client 
satisfaction (Sia et al. 2008), and meeting cost, quality, and productivity objectives (Rottman and 
Lacity 2008). For instance, Gopal et al. (2003) investigate how contract choice affects provider 
firm's profits. Their results suggest that provider firms realize more profits with larger contracts. 
The existing literature also examines how investors respond to different size of outsourcing 
contracts (e.g., Oh et al. 2006) and find that investors prefer smaller outsourcing contracts rather 
than the larger ones in that the larger outsourcing contracts are usually more complex and involve 
higher level of uncertainties and risks. 
 Contract flexibility refers to “the degree to which a contract specifies contingencies and 
enables parties to change contractual terms” (Lacity et al. 2010, p.423). A contract with high 
flexibility allows the parties to alter contract terms, to renegotiate contract terms, and to terminate 
the contract early. Contract flexibility has been found to positively affect outsourcing performance 
(e.g., Balaji and Brown 2010; Kern et al. 2002; Baldwin et al. 2001; McIvor et al. 2009; Sia et al. 
2008). For example, in ITO, Baldwin et al. (2001) conduct a case study with a bank. Their results 
suggest that contract flexibility increases the level of client satisfaction. Similarly, McIvor et al. 
(2009) assess the applicability of a number of performance management techniques in BPO. Their 
findings highlight the importance of context flexibility in improving business process performance.  
 Among the work on contractual governance factors, only a handful of studies have 
examined the role of appropriate contract specification or contract design (e.g., Fitoussi and 
Gurbaxani 2012; Kim et al. 2013). Fitoussi and Gurbaxani (2012) apply multitask agency theory 
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to study the relationship between incentive strength and contractual objectives. Based on a data set 
of 55 ITO contracts, they find that a contract using strong direct incentives for a specified 
measurable objective is less likely to include hard-to-measure objectives; in addition, when the 
number of performance metrics increases, the degree of client’s satisfaction decreases. Therefore, 
managerial attention should be paid to the specification of appropriate contract, such as including 
measurable performance metrics and considering the total number of objectives included in a 
contract. When client firms have directly measurable goals (e.g., cost reduction) and those are less 
measurable (e.g., service quality), managers must consider the underlying trade-offs. Therefore, in 
this study, we focus on this understudied contractual governance factor: contract specification, 
particularly financial contract terms specification, to empirically test how it affects outsourcing 
performance and interact with relational governance. 
 
2.5 Relational Governance 
 Relational governance refers to governance an outsourcing arrangement through social 
processes that advance norm of trust, reciprocity, flexibility, mutual understanding and so on (Goo 
et al. 2009; Poppo and Zenger 2002). A rich body of empirical studies, as summarized in Table 6, 
have investigated the impacts of relational governance factors on outsourcing performance (e.g., 
Kern and Willcocks 2002; Kim and Chung 2003; Klepper 1995; Lacity et al. 2004; Rottman and 
Lacity 2008; Sabherwal 1999; Rai et al. 2012). In general, relational governance has shown to 
improve outsourcing performance.  
Table 6: Impacts of Relational Governance Factors on Outsourcing Performance in Prior Literature 
# 
Author 
and Year 
Relational Factors* 
Outsourcing 
outcomes 
Type Method View Sample 
1 
Klepper 
(1995) 
Communication (+) 
Fair Bargaining (+) 
Justice (+) 
Norms (+) 
Relationship 
quality 
ITO 
Case 
Studies 
Client 
2 Case 
studies of IS 
partnership 
2 
Grover et 
al. (1996) 
Partnership (0) 
strategic, 
economic, and 
technological 
benefits 
ITO Survey Client 
188  client 
firms 
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# 
Author 
and Year 
Relational Factors* 
Outsourcing 
outcomes 
Type Method View Sample 
3 
Lee and 
Kim 
(1999) 
Benefits and risk 
sharing (+) 
Commitment (+) 
Conflict (0) 
Mutual understanding 
(+) 
Trust (+) 
(1) business 
perspective: 
business benefits 
realization; (2) 
customer 
satisfaction 
ITO 
Survey; 
interview 
Client 
74 
outsourcing 
relationships 
4 
Sabherwal 
(1999) 
Trust (+) 
Service quality, 
timely progress 
ITO 
Case 
Studies 
Client 
18 
outsourcing 
Projects 
5 
Baldwin 
et al. 
(2001) 
Communication (+) Satisfaction ITO 
Case 
Study 
Client 
1 major UK 
bank 
6 
Lee 
(2001) 
Partnership (+) 
Business value 
realization 
ITO Survey Client 195 firms 
7 
Gopal et 
al. (2002) 
Frequency of Project 
Status Meetings (-) 
Number of Liaisons 
(-) 
Project rework ITO Survey Provider 
34 
Application 
Software 
projects 
8 
Kern and 
Blois 
(2002) 
Lack of norms (+) 
Failed 
outsourcing 
consortium  
ITO 
Case 
Study 
Both 
1 client firm 
and its 
providers 
9 
Kern and 
Willcocks 
(2002) 
Commitment (+) 
Flexibility (M) 
Mutual understanding 
(+) 
Social tie (M) 
Trust (+) 
Relationship 
quality 
ITO 
Case 
studies 
Client 12 firms 
10 
Poppo and 
Zenger 
(2002) 
Relational 
governance 
(Composite) 
Satisfaction ITO Survey Client 
285 IS 
Executives 
11 
Gainey 
and Klaas 
(2003) 
Trust (+) 
Client 
satisfaction 
BPO Survey Client 
157 HR 
directors 
12 
Kim and 
Chung 
(2003) 
Flexibility (+) 
Partnership (+) 
Role Integrity (-) 
Monitoring of the 
vendor (0) 
Satisfaction 
ITO Survey Client 
355 
respondents 
Flexibility (+) 
Monitoring of the 
vendor (+) 
Partnership (0) 
Role Integrity (0) 
Non-economic 
benefits 
Flexibility (0) 
Partnership (0) 
Role Integrity (0) 
Monitoring of the 
vendor (+) 
Economic 
Benefits 
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# 
Author 
and Year 
Relational Factors* 
Outsourcing 
outcomes 
Type Method View Sample 
13 
Kaiser and 
Hawk 
(2004) 
Client-Supplier 
Interface Design (M) 
Mutual 
Understanding (+) 
Trust (M) 
Satisfaction ITO 
Case 
Study 
Client 
1 client firm 
and 1 
provider 
firm 
14 
Lacity et 
al. (2004) 
Client-Supplier 
Interface Design (M) 
Partnership View (+) 
cost reduction; 
service quality; 
shared revenue 
BPO 
Case 
Study 
Both 
1 client firm 
and 1 
provider 
firm 
15 
Lander et 
al. (2004) 
Trust (+) 
Generic 
Outsourcing 
Success- Not 
Specified 
ITO 
Cast 
Study 
Client 
1 
international 
manufacturi
ng company 
16 
Lee and 
Kim 
(2005) 
Benefits and risk 
sharing (+) 
Commitment (+) 
Trust (+) 
Shared knowledge 
(+) 
Mutual dependency 
(0) 
Joint venture (+) 
Business 
satisfaction and 
user satisfaction 
ITO Survey Client 
225 client 
firms 
17 
Borman 
(2006) 
Communication (+) 
Generic 
outsourcing 
success- not 
specified 
BPO 
Case 
Study 
Both 
3 client firms 
and 3 provider 
firms 
18 
Rottman 
and Lacity 
(2006) 
Client-supplier 
interface design (M) 
knowledge sharing 
(+) 
Frequency of project 
status meetings (+) 
Number of liaisons 
(+) 
Cost reduction; 
service quality; 
value-added 
transformation 
ITO interview Both 
159 
participants 
from 40 
companies 
19 
Sen and 
Shiel 
(2006) 
Communication (+) 
Mutual understanding 
(+) 
Partnership view (+) 
Process integration 
(+) 
Relationship 
quality 
BPO 
Case 
Studies 
Provider 
5 Provider 
Firms 
knowledge sharing 
(+) 
Client-supplier 
interface design (+) 
Generic 
outsourcing 
success- not 
specified 
20 
Oshri et 
al. (2007) 
Client-supplier 
interface design (M) 
Knowledge sharing 
(+) 
Generic 
outsourcing 
success- not 
specified 
ITO 
Case 
Study 
Provider 
1 provider 
firm 
21 
Raman et 
al. (2007) 
Social norms (M) 
Supplier 
employee 
turnover 
BPO 
Case 
Study 
Provider 
18 
interviews  
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and Year 
Relational Factors* 
Outsourcing 
outcomes 
Type Method View Sample 
22 
Alami et 
al. (2008) 
IT-enabled 
communication (M) 
Mutual understanding 
(+) 
Trust (+) 
Relationship 
quality 
ITO 
Case 
Studies 
Provider 
6 provider 
firms 
23 
Dibbern et 
al. (2008) 
Cultural distance (+) 
Geographic distance 
(+) 
Client extra costs ITO 
Case 
Studies 
Client 
6 
Outsourcing 
Projects  
24 
Han et al. 
(2008) 
Commitment (+) 
Trust (+) 
Strategic, 
economic, and 
technological 
benefits 
ITO Survey Client 
267 
Outsourcing 
Projects 
25 
Leonardi 
and Bailey 
(2008) 
Client-supplier 
interface design (+) 
Perceived 
effectiveness of 
offshoring 
arrangements 
ITO 
Case 
Study 
Client 
1 
manufacturi
ng firm 
26 
Levina 
and Su 
(2008) 
Commitment (+) 
Generic 
Outsourcing 
Success- Not 
Specified 
BPO 
Case 
Study 
Client 
1 financial 
services firm 
27 
Rottman 
and Lacity 
(2008) 
number of liaisons 
(+) 
Meeting Cost, 
quality, and 
productivity 
objectives 
ITO Interviews Client 
21 ITO 
Projects 
28 
Winkler et 
al. (2008) 
Conflict (-) 
Cooperation (+) 
Trust (+) 
Cost Reduction; 
Resource 
Quality; 
Increased 
Flexibility; 
Service Quality 
ITO 
Case 
Studies 
Client 
5 Client 
Firms 
29 
Wüllenweb
er et al. 
(2008) 
Conflict resolution 
(+) 
BPO Success is a 
formative 
construct using 
indicators of cost 
reduction, cost 
transparency, 
quality 
improvement, 
access to 
expertise, and 
focus on core 
competencies. 
BPO Survey Client 
335 BPO 
projects in 
215 German 
banks 
30 
Li et al. 
(2010) 
Social control (+) 
Outsourcing 
Performance 
BPO Survey N/A 
380 
domestic 
and 200 
international 
relationships 
31 
Balaji and 
Brown 
(2010) 
Trust (+) 
Execution-level 
Effectiveness 
ITO Survey Client 
141 IS 
Managers Business 
Benefits 
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# 
Author 
and Year 
Relational Factors* 
Outsourcing 
outcomes 
Type Method View Sample 
Functional 
Benefits 
32 
Gopal and 
Koka 
(2012) 
Relational flexibility 
(+) 
Profit 
ITO Survey Provider 
105 
contracts in 
a provider 
firm 
Service quality 
33 
Mani et al. 
(2012) 
Coordination (0) 
Fixed price 
Satisfaction 
BPO Survey Client 134 firms 
34 
Qi and 
Chau 
(2012) 
Trust (+) 
Knowledge sharing 
(+) 
Communication (+) 
Commitment (+) 
Economic, 
technological, 
and strategic 
benefits 
ITO 
Case 
Studies 
Client 
2 client 
firms 
35 
Rai et al. 
(2012) 
Relational 
governance (+) 
Satisfaction BPO Survey Client 
335 BPO 
ventures 
36 
Handley 
and 
Benton 
(2013) 
Relationship-specific 
investments (0) 
Cooperative 
Relationship (0) 
Control Cost 
ITO/
BPO 
Survey Both 
102 
Outsourcing 
Relationship
s 
Relationship-specific 
investments (0) 
Cooperative 
Relationship (+) 
Coordination 
Cost 
37 
Kim et al. 
(2013) 
Relationship Strength 
(+) 
Cost Efficiency; 
Performance 
Improvement; 
Satisfaction 
ITO Survey Client 
143 Client 
Companies 
*In this column, a sign of "+" indicates a significant and positive relationship between the relational governance factor 
and outsourcing outcome(s); a sign of "-" indicates a negative relationship; a sign of "0" indicates no impact; and a sign 
of "M" indicates that relational governance matters but may have positive/negative/no impact depending on some other 
factors. 
 
 Previous studies have mainly focused on the following relational governance factors: trust 
(e.g., Kern and Willcocks 2002; Sabherwal 1999; Winkler et al. 2008; Qi and Chau 2012), client-
provider interface design (e.g., Lacity et al. 2004; Rottman and Lacity 2006), partnership view (e.g., 
Lee 2001; Sen and Shiel 2006) , commitment (e.g., Han et al. 2008; Lee and Kim 1999), 
communication (e.g., Baldwin et al. 2001; Borman 2006), and knowledge sharing (e.g., Oshri et 
al. 2007; Rottman and Lacity 2006; Sen and Shiel 2006).  
 Trust is the most important factor of relational governance. Although trust has been studied 
using various alternative theoretical lens, it is generally believed that it consists of a party's 
willingness to make itself vulnerable to the other party (e.g., Dibbern et al. 2008; Lacity et al. 2010; 
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Sabherwal 1999). The extant empirical studies have found that trust is positively associated with 
outsourcing performance such as economic, technological, and strategic benefits (Qi and Chau 
2012), client satisfaction (Gainey and Klaas 2003), execution-level effectiveness (Balaji and Brown 
2010), and good quality and timely progress (Sabherwal 1999). For example, Gainey and Klaas 
(2003) find that socially-oriented trust, which evolves over time, increases the level of client 
satisfaction. Qi and Chau (2012) integrate theories from economics, marketing, strategic 
management, and information systems fields to investigate the effects of contractual and relational 
governance on ITO performance. Their results indicate that trust is positively associated with 
economic, technological, and strategic benefits. 
 Client and provider interface design refers to the structure that defines “where, when, and 
how client and supplier employees can work, interact, and communicate effectively” (Lacity et al. 
2010, p. 423). A variety of client-provider interface design have been described in previous studies 
(e.g., Kaiser and Hawk 2004; Lacity et al. 2004; Leonardi and Bailey 2008; Oshri et al. 2007; 
Rottman and Lacity 2006; Sen and Shiel 2006). For example, in ITO, Rottman and Lacity (2006) 
reveal that clients need to keep more provider employees onshore at the initial stage of outsourcing 
project because of cultural, time zone, methodological, and language differences. In addition, 
onshore presence of provider staff can facilitate the knowledge sharing and transfer between client 
and provider employees. In BPO, Lacity et al. (2004) argue that providers should seek for client’s 
participation through jointly managed committees and boards, which may improve outsourcing 
performance in terms of lower costs, better service, and shared revenues. 
 Partnership view is defined as a client firm's consideration of providers as "trusted partners 
rather than opportunistic vendors" (Lacity et al. 2010, p.42). A successful partnership requires 
involved parties to be familiar with each other's business visions, tasks, critical issues, as well as 
organizational culture (Kaiser and Hawk 2004). In particular, when clients and providers are in 
different countries, there are more barriers in developing a successful partnership because of 
differences in time zones, language, and cultures (Kaiser and Hawk 2004). The empirical studies 
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in partnership view have produced mixed results (e.g., Grover et al. 1996; Kim and Chung 2003; 
Lacity et al. 2004; Lee 2001; Sen and Shiel 2006). Grover et al. (1996) find that partnership view 
does not significantly impact the attainment of strategic, economic, and technological benefits in 
ITO, whereas Sen and Shiel (2006) conduct case studies with 5 provider firms and claim that 
partnership view can foster a better outsourcing relationship in BPO. 
 Commitment is defined as the degree to which clients and providers pledge to sustain a 
relationship (e.g., Lee and Kim 1999; Lacity et al. 2010). In outsourcing research, both contractual 
commitment and relationship commitment have been discussed (e.g., Lee and Kim 1999; Lee and 
Kim 2005). Contractual commitment for clients implies trying to pay the service fee and offering 
the support as contractually agreed (Kern and Willcocks 2002). Conversely for providers, 
contractual commitment means achieving contractually stipulated goals (Kern and Willcocks 2002). 
Relationship commitment encourages clients and providers to make specific investment in a 
relationship, to resist attractive short-term substitutes, and to view potentially high-risk activities 
as being acceptable due to the belief that the other party will not carry out opportunistic actions 
(Lee and Kim 2005). Previous studies have consistently found that commitment is positively 
associated with outsourcing performance (Han et al. 2008; Kern and Willcocks 2002; Lee and Kim 
1999; Lee and Kim 2005; Levina and Su 2008; Qi and Chau 2012). Levina and Su (2008) observe 
that in multi-sourcing strategy, commitment from clients can enable continuous innovation in the 
provider side. Lee and Kim (2005) find that commitment can improve both user satisfaction and 
business satisfaction. 
 Communication is more than day-to-day information exchange between client and provider 
(Klepper 1995). It refers to "the degree to which parties are willing to openly discuss their 
expectations, directions for the future, their capabilities, and/or their strengths and weaknesses" 
(Lacity et al. 2010, p.423). Prior literature has consistently found that communication has positive 
impact on outsourcing performance (e.g., Baldwin et al. 2001; Borman 2006; Qi and Chau 2012; 
Sen and Shiel 2006). Borman (2006) contends that, from both client and provider perspectives, 
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open communication leads to better BPO performance. Qi and Chan (2012) argue that 
communication is one of the major components of ITO relationship and claim that good 
communication can help achieve better economic, technological, and strategic benefits. 
 Knowledge sharing in outsourcing arrangements has been underscored by many scholars 
in the extant literature (e.g., Oshri et al. 2007, Qi and Chau 2012; Rottman and Lacity 2006; Sen 
and Shiel 2006). Knowledge sharing refers to the extent to which clients and providers are willing 
to share and/or transfer knowledge (Lacity et al. 2011a). Effective knowledge sharing has been 
found to secure service quality, reduce development costs (Rottman and Lacity 2006), improve 
relationship quality (Sen and Shiel), and gain more strategic, economic and technological benefits 
(Qi and Chau 2012).  
 Among this stream of empirical studies, only a small number of papers have examined the 
impact of conflict resolution on outsourcing performance (e.g., Wüllenweber et al. 2008). Conflict 
is embedded in outsourcing arrangements due to partner opportunism, conflicting goals, technology 
complexity, and cultural differences (Doz 1996, Goo et al. 2009). Given the fact that conflict is 
inevitable in outsourcing arrangements, conflict resolution is important in that its impact on the 
outsourcing relationship can be either productive or destructive (Deutsch 1973). Conflict resolution, 
which is defined as the extent to which partners achieve mutual satisfaction and reach agreements 
and consensus (Goo et al. 2009; Robey et al. 1989), is believed to positively affect outsourcing 
performance (Wüllenweber  et al. 2008). Therefore, there is a growing need to understand the role 
of conflict resolution in outsourcing arrangements. In this study, we treat relational governance as 
a composite construct to understand its impact on outsourcing performance. 
 
2.6 Outsourcing Performance 
 According to multitask agency theory (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991), clients generally 
have more than one objective in outsourcing arrangements. For example, clients may want to 
simultaneously reduce costs and improve service quality through an outsourcing arrangement 
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(Fitoussi and Gurbaxani 2012). Prior literature has studied a plethora of ITO and BPO outcomes 
(Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity et al. 2011a), including economic benefits (e.g., Fisher et al. 2008), 
service quality (e.g., Winkler et al. 2008), satisfaction (e.g., Lee and Kim 2005), provider's 
profitability (e.g., Gopal et al. 2003), strategic benefits (e.g., Lee 2001), technology benefits (e.g., 
Grover et al. 1996), provider's business growth (e.g., Bharadwaj and Saxena 2009), and innovation 
effects (e.g., Fifarek et al. 2008). In general, academic researchers have considered ITO and BPO 
performance at four levels: firm level, IS department/business function level, relationship level, 
and project level (Lacity et al. 2010). In this study, we are interested in two outsourcing 
performance metrics at the relationship level: service quality (provider's performance) and 
economic benefits (client's firm benefits). These are two of the most frequently employed 
outsourcing performance metrics. 
2.6.1 Service Quality 
 Service quality is an important indicator of information systems success (e.g., Grover et al. 
1996; Jiang et al. 2000; Pitt et al. 1995). In general, service quality is conceptualized along five 
dimensions: reliability, responsiveness, assurance, tangibility, and empathy (e.g., Parasuraman et 
al. 1985; 1988; Su and Levina 2011). More specifically, reliability refers to the degree to which 
promised services are delivered reliably and accurately; responsiveness refers to the degree to 
which prompt services are delivered; assurance refers to the extent to which provider employees 
has knowledge and capabilities to build trust and confidence; tangibles refer to the appearance of 
related physical facilities and equipment and the availability of provider employees; and empathy 
refers to the degree to which individualized attention is provided to the clients (e.g., Parasuraman 
et al. 1988; Su and Levina 2011).  
 In outsourcing research, service quality is generally measured as perceived satisfactory 
service delivered by a provider (e.g., Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity et al. 2011a; Lee and Kim 1999; 
Lewin and Peeters 2006; Park and Kim 2005). Prior literature has examined whether outsourcing 
can gain better service quality (e.g., Cross 1995; Park and Kim 2005), whether larger contract size 
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is associated with higher level of service quality (e.g., Domberger et al. 2000), and whether 
relationship quality can affect the service quality delivered by providers (e.g., Chakrabarty et al. 
2008; Deng et al. 2013). However, very little attention has been paid to the impacts of client 
capabilities and provider capabilities, as well as governance mechanisms, on the service quality in 
ITO and BPO literatures.  
2.6.2 Economic Benefits 
 Outsourcing performance can be assessed by the achievement of business benefits (Grover 
et al. 1996; Kern and Willcocks 2000, Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity et al. 2011a; Ranganathan and 
Balaji 2007). Three categories of business benefits have been examined in IS literature, including 
economic benefits, strategic benefits, and technological benefits (e.g., Grover et al. 1996). 
Specifically, economic benefits refer to “improving the business' financial position” (Lacity and 
Willcocks 2001, p.315); strategic benefits refers to a firm's efforts to “focus on its core business, 
outsource routine IT activities so that it can focus on strategic uses of IT, and enhance IT 
competence and expertise through contractual arrangements with an outsourcer” (Grover et al. 1996, 
p.93); and technological benefits refer to “strengthening resources and flexibility in technology 
service to underpin business' strategic direction” (Lacity and Willcocks 2001, p.317).  
 Clients may expect to realize different categories of business values depending on their 
outsourcing strategies (Lee et al. 2004). Among the expected business values, economic benefit or 
cost saving is the most cited objective in both ITO and BPO research (e.g., Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity 
et al. 2011a; Lacity and Willcocks 1998; Rottman and Lacity 2004; Willcocks et al. 2007). In a 
successful outsourcing relationship, a client firm can realize the economic benefits they expect.  
 
2.7 Summary 
 Our literature review highlights the critical links between determinants (client's capabilities, 
provider's capabilities, contractual governance, relational governance) and outsourcing 
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performance (e.g., business value realization, service quality). However, there are some limitations 
in the extant literature. 
 First, very limited studies have looked at the interaction effects (Goo et al. 2009; Han et al. 
2013; Parmigiani and Mitchell 2010; Poppo and Zenger 2002; Rai et al. 2012). Among the limited 
studies, the majority of them have examined the interaction effect between contractual governance 
and relational governance on outsourcing performance (Goo et al. 2009; Poppo and Zenger 2002; 
Rai et al. 2012). Little recognition has been given to the interactions between client's and provider's 
capabilities (e.g., Han et al. 2013) as well as the interactions between governance mechanisms and 
capabilities (e.g., Parmigiani and Mitchell 2010), leaving a gap of further understanding how to 
foster capabilities from two parties and how to combine capabilities with appropriate governance 
mechanisms. Second, although previous studies have examined a wide range of contractual 
governance factors, IS scholars paid little attention to the role of contract specification in 
outsourcing performance. Third, the existing studies mainly adopt qualitative research methods 
such as case studies or interviews to test impacts of determinants on outsourcing performance. 
Hence, survey instruments for some of the constructs, in particular for capabilities constructs, have 
not been replicated enough. Last, the extant literature lacks a contingency perspective. According 
to contingency theory (Fielder 1964; Drazin and Van de Ven 1985; Schoonhoven 1981), different 
patterns of relevant contextual, structural, and strategic factors may result in various firm 
performance (Doty et al. 1993). Therefore, when considering from different perspective (client vs. 
provider), the impacts of capabilities and governance mechanisms on the outsourcing performance 
may change.  
 This study aims to bridge these gaps in IS literature by examining: (1) main effects of 
capabilities and governance mechanisms on outsourcing performance; (2) interaction effects  of 
client's and provider's capabilities and governance mechanisms; and (3) whether the main effects 
and interaction effects vary from different perspective (client versus provider). 
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Chapter Three 
 
RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 This study focuses on modeling the main and interaction effects of capabilities and 
governance mechanisms on outsourcing performance. In particular, we examine how capabilities 
and governance mechanisms influence provider's service quality and client's economic benefits 
independently and jointly. These are two most often used indicators of outsourcing success in the 
literature (e.g. Grover et al. 1996; Su and Levina 2011). We develop a research model based on 
resource-based theory, transaction cost economics, relational exchange theories and IS literature.  
Method suggested by Goo et al. (2009) and Rai et al. (2012) is used to empirically test the 
relationships between these critical determinants and outsourcing performance. Figure 2 depicts 
our research model at a broad level. 
 
Figure 2: Research Model at a Broad Level 
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 In this research model, we propose that: (1) provider's service quality is determined by 
provider's capabilities and governance mechanisms; (2) client's economic benefits are determined 
by client's capabilities, governance mechanisms, and provider's service quality; (3) provider's 
capabilities and governance mechanisms work together in affecting provider's service quality; (4) 
client's capabilities and governance mechanisms are intertwined in influencing client's economic 
benefits; and (5) provider's service quality mediates the relationship between provider's capabilities 
and client's economic benefits. We make the above arguments based on the following three 
rationales.  
 First, according to resource-based theory (RBT) (Barney 1991; Grant 1996), a firm's 
competitive position within an industry depends on its resources and capabilities. Thus, we argue 
that provider's service quality, which is an indicator of provider's firm performance, highly depends 
on its own capabilities. Likewise, client's economic benefits, which is also an indicator of client's 
firm performance also heavily rely on its own capabilities. In addition, in an outsourcing 
arrangement, clients receive services, not capabilities, directly from providers. Change a word, 
provider's service quality is also an input source of client's firm performance. As a result, provider's 
service quality can affect client's economic benefits directly. Therefore, we also argue that 
provider's capabilities don't affect client's economic benefits directly, rather, they influence it 
through their service quality. 
 Second, as suggested by transaction cost economics (TCE) (Williamson 1975; 1981) and 
relational exchange theories (Blau 1964; Macneil 1978, 1980), both contractual governance and 
relational governance are vital to outsourcing performance. Contractual governance can prevent 
provider's opportunistic behaviors and protect client's benefits (e.g., Poppo and Zenger 2002). 
Relational governance can build a trustful environment for providers to deliver high quality of 
services and ensure clients harvest expected economic benefits (e.g., Grover et al. 1996). Hence, 
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we propose that governance mechanisms (contractual and relational) influence both provider's 
service quality and client's economic benefits. 
 Third, as suggested by Barney et al. (2011), firm's resources and capabilities are always 
linked with other external sources in maintaining performance of inter-firm arrangements. Also, 
prior literature has suggested that firm's capabilities and governance mechanisms jointly influence 
buyer-supplier relationship (Parmigiani and Mitchell 2010). Therefore, we propose that the 
interaction effects of provider's capabilities and governance mechanisms, and of client's capabilities 
and governance mechanisms affect provider's service quality and client's economic benefits 
respectively (Argyres and Zenger 2012). 
 To further our understanding, we expand our research model by examining specific client's 
and provider's capabilities. More specifically, we examine the most important client's capability - 
client's ability to manage providers, and three provider's capabilities - provider's human resource 
management capability, provider's risk management capability, and provider's innovativeness. 
Table 7 summarizes constructs used in this study. Figure 3 presents the complete research model 
and hypotheses. Hypotheses development is discussed as below. 
 Table 7: Constructs Used In The Research Model 
Construct Definition Key Reference 
Client's 
Capability to 
Manage 
Provider 
Client's capability to manage an outsourcing 
relationship with providers using effective 
processes, tools, and technologies. 
Feeny and Willcocks 
(1998) 
Ranganathan and Balaji 
(2007) 
Sanders et al. (2007) 
Willcocks et al. (2007) 
Provider's 
Human 
Resource 
Management 
Capability 
A provider's capability to identify, recruit, train, 
deploy, and retain effective human capital and to 
have effective policies in place to achieve expected 
outsourcing objectives. 
Koh et al. (2004) 
Levina and Ross (2003) 
Kuruvilla and 
Ranganthan (2010) 
Lacity et al. (2004) 
Provider's Risk 
Management 
Capability  
A provider's capability to identify, rate and 
mitigate potential risks and compliance in order to 
minimize the probability of their negative impacts. 
Taylor (2007) 
Sen and Shiel (2006) 
Narayanan et al. (2011) 
Provider's 
Innovativeness 
A provider's capability to create innovations or 
continuous improvements to client firm. 
Lacity and Willcocks 
(2013) 
Willcocks et al. (2013) 
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 Table 7: Constructs Used In The Research Model 
Contractual 
Governance  
Governance of outsourcing relationship through 
written contracts and legal provisions. In this 
study, we focus on the specification of contract 
financial terms, such as whether having 
appropriate incentives for providers, reflecting the 
best practices in the current market, and 
considering currency inflation. 
Rai et al. (2012) 
Fitsoussi and Gurbaxani 
(2012) 
Kim et al. (2013) 
Relational 
Governance 
Governance of outsourcing relationship through 
implementation of obligations, promises, and 
expectations. 
Goo et al. (2009) 
Poppo and Zenger 
(2002) 
Wüllenweber et al. 2008 
Economic 
Benefits 
Achievement of expected economic value in 
general. 
Grover et al. (1996) 
Lacity and Willcocks 
(2001) 
Lee et al. (2004) 
Service Quality A perception of service performance delivered by a 
provider. 
Grover et al. (1996) 
Lacity et al. (2010) 
Lee and Kim (1999) 
  
 
Figure 3: Complete Research Model and Hypotheses 
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3.1 Hypotheses of Main Effects 
 Provider's Human Resources Management Capability has been deemed as one of the most 
important factors related to outsourcing performance (e.g., Koh et al. 2004; Kuruvilla and 
Ranganathan 2010; Lacity et al. 2010, 2011a; Levina and Ross 2003). One of the top reasons why 
clients outsource is to gain access to provider's skills and expertise (Lacity et al. 2010, 2011a). For 
this to take place, providers should be able to manage their human resources effectively by 
assigning right people with right skill sets to work on outsourcing projects and having certain 
mechanisms in place to retain high-quality employees during the project (Koh et al. 2004). In 
addition, providers should have appropriate domain knowledge to understand client's implemented 
technologies or business processes (e.g., Gopal et al. 2002, Rao et al. 2006). Providers with better 
domain understanding can be more responsive to client's demands, thus providing better service 
quality. Moreover, outsourcing arrangements may involve transferring employees from clients to 
providers (e.g., Beulen and Ribbers 2003). Providers should be able to identify transferred staff's 
strengths and weaknesses, then learn from their strengths and create opportunities for their skills 
improvement. By this way, providers can gain better understanding of client firm's business 
knowledge and culture, in turn, deliver better service to client firms. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: Provider's human resources management capability is positively related to its 
service quality. 
 
Provider's Risk Management Capability. An outsourcing arrangement involves a variety 
of risks, ranging from country-level, firm-level, to transaction-level risks (Taylor 2006, Taylor 
2007, Sen and Shiel 2006). Country-level risks are environmental factors influenced by 
client's/provider's country characteristics. Country-level risks may include risks such as 
macroeconomic and financial shocks, infrastructure risks, regulatory and political stability, time 
and cultural differences, and government efficiency and corruption (Hahn et al. 2009; Rottman and 
Lacity 2004). Firm-level risks include risks such as intellectual property, brand identity, as well as 
data security (Earl 1996; Loh and Venkatraman 1995; Lacity et al. 2010; 2011a). Transaction-level 
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risks results from transaction-specific factors, including provider opportunism, asset specificity, 
transaction frequency, uncertainties, and interdependency (Oh et al. 2006). In this study, we 
investigate how provider's capability to manage these risks is related to outsourcing performance. 
 Prior studies have suggested that prudent risk management can help achieve successful 
outcomes (Schmidt et al. 2001). However, many of them have underlined the importance of risk 
management from clients (e.g., Rottman and Lacity 2004), largely ignoring the equally important 
one from providers. We argue that provider's risk management capability is positively associated 
with their service quality. There are two underlying reasons for this. First, providers with better risk 
management capability are more likely to establish a stable business environment, which is critical 
for providers to deliver high quality service. Second, outsourcing risks are evolving (Hahn et al. 
2009). It is not easy to keep up with changing risks. Therefore, providers need to have strong risk 
management capability in place in order to be responsive to clients. Providers should be able to 
respond quickly to environmental or financial crisis with contingency plans. Providers should also 
be able to protect client’s data, brand identify, and intellectual property. Moreover, they should be 
able to identify hidden risks in the outsourcing arrangements and mitigate them with appropriate 
actions. Providers can improve this capability through increasing investment in process control, 
technology, staff training, assessment and other management practices (Sen and Shiel 2006). 
Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: Provider's risk management capability is positively related to its service quality. 
 
 
 Provider's Innovativeness. In recent years, innovation has become a top reason for both IT 
and business processes outsourcing (Ciravegna and Maielli 2011; Lacity and Willcocks 2013; 
Lucena 2011; Nieto and Rodriguez 2011). Many client firms have looked beyond short-term 
objectives such as cost savings or technical expertise and focused more on long-term objectives 
such as continuous improvement of existing technologies/business processes and new 
product/market (Lacity and Willcocks 2013). In this study, we argue that provider's innovativeness 
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can also improve its service quality. Since this study focuses on ongoing outsourcing relationships, 
innovations can also be referred to as proactive improvements made to an existing service 
(Wallenburg 2009). Proactive improvements are very important in an outsourcing arrangement for 
two reasons. First, the bounded rationality of both clients and providers prevent them from ex ante 
designing the service in a way accounting for all possible contingencies (Williamson 1975; 1981). 
Therefore, over time, clients may change their strategies and requirements. Whether providers can 
cooperate with these changes affect client's perception of provider's service quality. Second, over 
time, providers gain more knowledge about client needs and specific technologies or business 
functions. According to the theory of organizational learning (March 1991; Nevis et al. 1995; 
Nonaka 1994), providers with innovativeness are more likely to learn from their experience and 
then improve their services. Combined, these reasons support our argument that provider's 
innovativeness can improve its service quality. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: Provider's innovativeness is positively related to its service quality. 
 
 
 Contractual Governance. Contractual governance relies on formal contracts and legal 
stipulations to govern outsourcing arrangements (Goo et al. 2009; Poppo and Zenger 2002). The 
more detailed the contract is, the greater is the description of obligations, promises, legal processes 
for dispute resolution, and terms of early termination (Poppo and Zenger 2002). It monitors 
outsourcing exchange process and enforces roles and responsibilities of each party according to the 
contract terms. Contract specification is a firm's ability to design appropriate terms that align the 
goals of both parties (Ranganathan and Balaji 2007). Thus, how to accurately and properly specify 
contract terms is very crucial to outsourcing performance. 
 Outsourcing is a service provided by an external provider that could involve developing an 
IT product, providing IT operations and management services, or taking care of a client firm's 
business processes (Grover et al. 1996; Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity et al. 2011a). As suggested by 
marketing literature, services are fundamentally different from physical goods (Bowen and 
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Schneither 1988). Services are intangible and integrally involve buyers in services creation (Levitt 
1981; Parasuraman et al. 1985; 1988). Therefore, evaluation of the service quality is more difficult 
than that of the physical goods. When there is no tangible evidence existing to assess service quality, 
buyers or potential buyers must rely on other surrogates or cues for quality (Grover et al. 1996). 
Prior literature has suggested that formal contracts in outsourcing can serve as surrogates to ensure 
service quality delivered by providers (Domberger et al. 2000; Fitoussi and Gurbaxani 2012; Gopal 
and Koka 2012; Lacity et al. 1995). Formal contracts can provide a set of SLAs to protect 
opportunistic behaviors from both clients and providers, which may result in better service quality 
from providers.  
 Many scholars have also claimed that contractual governance has a significant impact on 
client's economic benefits realization (e.g., Allen et al. 2002; Barthélemy 2001; Lacity and 
Willcocks 1998; Lee et al. 2004; McFarlan and Nolan 1995; Wüllenweber et al. 2008).  For 
example, Allen et al. (2002) argue that a poorly structured contract may leave clients in a vulnerable 
position with providers. The effects may include a routine slow response to client's requests. This 
may result in switching provider, contract renegotiation, or even legal disputes in court. All of these 
incur extra transaction costs, which in turn reduce client's economic benefits. In addition, as 
indicated by TCE (Williamson 1975; 1981) and Agency Theory (Eisenhardt 1989), outsourcing 
arrangements involve various risks arising from exchange hazards and provider opportunism. The 
effective client firms usually have structured processes for contract design. Clients can include 
appropriate incentives in contract to reduce provider’s opportunistic behaviors. They can also 
define contract terms based on current market best practices to address possible changes in the 
contract terms. All of these can help clients achieve expected economic benefits. Therefore, we 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4: Contractual governance positively influences service quality in outsourcing. 
Hypothesis 5: Contractual governance positively influences client's economic benefits. 
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 Relational Governance. We adopt the social conceptualization of relational governance in 
this study, which deviates from the economic conceptualization proposed by Williamson (1985). 
Williamson (1985) posits that relational governance is an intermediary governance mode between 
market and vertical integration and it is upheld by economic weapons to prevent opportunistic 
behavior. We define relational governance as implementation of obligations, promises, and 
expectations through social processes such as trust, communication, and conflict resolution (Goo 
et al. 2009; Poppo and Zenger 2002). 
 It is widely accepted that an outsourcing relationship with high quality is more likely to 
achieve greater service quality (Chakrabarty et al. 2008; Klepper 1995; Saxena and Bharadwaj 
2009). In a healthy outsourcing relationship, a client and a provider share common goals, trust each 
other, make specific investment to the relationship, communicate effectively, and have a strong tie. 
Under this kind of circumstance, a provider firm is more likely to assign high-quality and 
experienced employees to the project, and respond to client firm's requests promptly. Likewise, a 
client firm may commit more to knowledge sharing and transfer, and pay fees in time. As a result, 
it is more likely that provider firm will deliver expected outsourcing services on time and within 
budget. 
 In general, firms with effective relational governance institute formal and informal 
structures, as well as new processes to monitor and coordinate their outsourcing relationship 
(Ranganathan and Balaji 2007). They establish joint teams and committees, periodically review 
outsourcing performance, hold meetings to coordinate between the firms, put mechanisms in place 
for shared decision marking, and set up conflict resolution procedures counting on mutual 
communications and collaborative problem solving. Accordingly, relational governance is more 
likely to result in more economic benefits of clients. Thus, we argue:  
Hypothesis 6: Relational governance positively influences service quality in outsourcing. 
Hypothesis 7: Relational governance positively influences client's economic benefits. 
 
47 
 
 Client's Provider Management Capability. According to the theories on inter-firm 
coordination (Sobrero and Schrader 1998), client's capability to manage providers in an outsourcing 
arrangement can ensure that they receive expected business values (Willcocks et al. 2007). When 
clients have required skills and experienced human resources, they know more about the potential 
behavioral implications of contract terms, the commercial consequences of new technologies 
deployment or business processes redesign, and the benchmarking applied to measure whether they 
get the expected values. In addition, established processes, tools, or technologies can help clients 
periodically review the performance of providers with key internal stakeholders or their providers. 
Taken together, clients with stronger capability to manage providers can execute better controls on 
outsourcing contracts/relationships, which in turn ensure that they realize expected economic 
benefits. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 8: Client's provider management capability is positively related to its economic 
benefits achieved from an outsourcing relationship. 
 
 Service quality. IS literature has primarily examined service quality as a dependent variable 
and focused on identifying determinants of service quality (e.g., Domberger et al. 2000; 
Blumenberg et al. 2009). For instance, Domberger et al. (2000) analyze data of 48 outsourcing 
contracts for IT support and maintenance and find that larger contracts are more likely to have 
better service quality. Blumenberg et al. (2009) interview six German banks with their providers 
and their results indicate that effective knowledge sharing positively influence service quality. Only 
very limited studies have examined the impact of service quality on other outsourcing performance 
indicators (Charkrabarty et al. 2008; Rajeev and Vani 2009; Yoon and Im 2005). Charkrabarty et 
al. (2008) and Yoon and Im (2005) examine the relationship between service quality and user 
satisfaction in ITO. They find that service quality positively influences user satisfaction. Rajeev 
and Vani (2009) highlight the importance of service quality in improving the provider's firm 
business performance. Although the number of previous studies on the impact of service quality is 
small, they all indicate that service quality has a positive effect on other outsourcing performance 
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indicators. In this study, we argue that service quality positively affect client's economic benefits 
for two reasons. First, high level of service quality implies that providers are responsive, flexible, 
and adaptable to client's changes. As a result, clients will incur less extra costs for contract 
facilitation and renegotiation (Dibbern et al. 2008). Second, providers with high level of service 
quality are able to meet specified requirements in contracts in terms of delivering products or 
services on time and within budget. It is more likely that clients would realize expected economic 
benefits specified in the contract. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 9: Provider's service quality is positively related to client's economic benefits achieved 
from an outsourcing relationship. 
 
3.2 Hypotheses of Interaction Effects 
 According to Resource-based Theory (Barney 1991; Grant 1996; Oliver 1997; Winter 
2003), client's and provider's capabilities are strategic resources for outsourcing performance. 
However, there are many other factors that are also crucial to outsourcing performance such as 
contractual governance and relational governance. Prior literature has suggested that scholars 
should integrate resource-based view with other perspectives to explain inter-organizational 
relationship and explore their interaction effects (e.g., Makadok 2011; Mayer and Salomon 2006). 
Therefore, in this study, besides examining the main effects, we also explore the interaction effects 
of governance mechanisms and capabilities on two indicators of outsourcing performance. More 
specifically, we explore the interaction effects of two governance mechanisms and three provider's 
capabilities on service quality, and the interaction effects of two governance mechanisms and 
client's provider management capability on economic benefits. 
3.2.1 Contractual Governance and Three Provider's Capabilities 
 As suggested by literature (Barney et al. 2011; Mayer and Salomon 2006), we integrate the 
transaction cost economics with resource-based theory to understand outsourcing phenomenon. 
Past research on outsourcing has suggested that both contractual governance and provider's 
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capabilities are critical to outsourcing performance (e.g., Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity et al. 2011a). In 
this study, we focus on outsourcing arrangements which have selected providers. Therefore, we are 
trying to answer the research question: in the presence of strong contractual governance, how will 
the relationships between provider's capabilities and service quality change?  
 Contractual governance has been demonstrated as a determinant of outsourcing 
performance in prior literature (Goo et al. 2009; Poppo and Zenger 2002; Rai et al. 2012). In the 
presence of strong contractual governance, clients and providers select appropriate contract type 
and specify contract terms in details to include measurements of outcomes, incentives, and penalties 
in the contract (Goo et al. 2009; Lacity and Willcocks 1998; Poppo and Zenger 2002). Under this 
kind of circumstance, even providers with poor capabilities will try their best to meet client's 
requirements and deliver satisfied service because they may face penalties if not delivering 
expected products or services. In contrast, when contractual governance is low, service quality of 
an outsourcing arrangement highly depends on provider's capabilities. Providers with excellent 
human resource management capability are still able to assign qualified employees to the project, 
have risk management and compliance in place, and create innovations for clients. All of these may 
result in a high service quality. However, providers with poor human resources management 
capability, risk management capability, and innovativeness may take advantage of this.  They are 
more likely to deliver poor quality because there is little formal controls in place. Therefore, we 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 10a: In the presence of strong contractual governance, the relationship between 
provider's human resources management capability and service quality decreases. 
Hypothesis 10b: In the presence of strong contractual governance, the relationship between 
provider's risk management capability and service quality decreases. 
Hypothesis 10c: In the presence of strong contractual governance, the relationship between 
provider's innovativeness and service quality decreases. 
3.2.2 Relational Governance and Three Provider's Capabilities 
50 
 
 As discussed early, both relational governance and provider's capabilities are critical to 
service quality (e.g., Lacity et al. 2004; Rao et al. 2006; Winkler et al. 2008). We integrate relational 
exchange theories with resource-based view to understand the interaction effects of relational 
governance and three provider's capabilities. According to relational exchange theory, relational 
exchange such as outsourcing arrangement is based on social components, by and large denoted by 
mutual trust and commitment (Macneil 1980). In addition, outsourcing relationship is dynamic. As 
clients and providers know more about one another, relational governance may be adjusted. 
Therefore, it is essential for us to understand how the relationships between provider's capabilities 
and service quality will change with different levels of relational governance. In this study, we 
argue that relational governance negatively moderate the relationships between provider's 
capabilities and service quality. That is, in the presence of strong relational governance, the impacts 
of provider's capabilities on service quality decrease. 
 When clients and providers have effective relational governance in place, they have shared 
goals, trust and depend on each other, and make adaptations as circumstances change (Goo et al. 
2009; Poppo and Zenger 2002). That is, in the presence of strong relational governance, both clients 
and providers are trying to develop a mutually beneficial and long-term relationship. Regardless of 
their capabilities, providers will try to deliver best services they can. Providers with poor 
capabilities may try to assign their best employees to the project, invest more in risk management 
and compliance, and focus more on creating innovations rather than making profits. Likewise, 
clients tend to perceive higher service quality of providers even though providers may have 
relatively poor capabilities. Therefore, in the presence of strong relational governance, service 
quality depends less on provider's capabilities. In contrast, when the level of relational governance 
is low, client and providers may have divergent business goals, mistrust, and conflicts. Under this 
circumstance, service quality highly relies on provider's capabilities. Providers have good 
capabilities can still deliver desired service. While providers with poor capabilities may assign 
junior staff to the outsourcing project, invest less in risk management and compliance initiatives, 
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and focus more on making profits rather than creating innovations. All of these may result in poor 
service quality. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 11a: In the presence of strong relational governance, the relationship between 
provider's human resources management capability and service quality decreases. 
Hypothesis 11b: In the presence of strong relational governance, the relationship between 
provider's risk management capability and service quality decreases. 
Hypothesis 11c: In the presence of strong relational governance, the relationship between 
provider's innovativeness and service quality decreases. 
3.2.3 Governance Mechanisms and Client's Provider Management Capability 
 A small number of previous studies has examined the interaction effects of client's 
capability and governance mechanisms in outsourcing arrangements (e.g., Mayer and Salomon 
2006; Parmigiani and Mitchell 2010; Vankatraman 1989). Vankatraman (1989) suggests that a fit 
between capabilities and governance mechanisms may influence firm's performance. Mayer and 
Salomon (2006) address the joint effects of client's technological capabilities and interdependencies 
between clients and providers on the decision of subcontracting. They find that the interaction of 
client's technological capabilities and interdependency has a positive and significant effect on 
subcontracting decision. That is, strong client's technological capabilities allows client firms to 
subcontract a project in the face of higher levels of interdependencies between clients and providers. 
Parmigiani and Mitchell (2010) also consider the joint effects of client's technical expertise and 
governance mechanisms on multiple indicators of outsourcing performance. They find that the 
interaction of client's technical expertise and relational governance has a positive and significant 
effect on one outsourcing performance indicator - cooperation.  
  Among a set of client's core capabilities, client's provider management capability has been 
considered as the most important one to govern and manage outsourcing arrangement (Feeny and 
Willcocks 1998; Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity et al. 2011a). However, none of the existing studies has 
explored the interaction effects of client's provider management capabilities and governance 
mechanisms on outsourcing performance. In this study, we integrate resource-based view, 
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transaction cost economics, and relational exchange theories to explore the interaction effects of 
client's provider management capabilities and governance mechanisms on client's economic 
benefits. 
 After providers have been selected, clients who have strong capability to manage providers 
are able to coordinate outsourcing activities with organization's core and critical activities, monitor 
the progress of outsourcing arrangement, and assess outsourcing risks and contingency plan 
(Bharadwaj et al. 2010). Consequently, in the presence of strong client's provider management 
capability, clients are able to execute more controls on the outsourcing arrangements in order to 
realize economic benefits even when contractual governance and relational governance are low. 
Change a word, when contractual governance is low, clients can monitor outsourcing arrangements 
more closely in order to realize economic benefits. Also, when relational governance is low, strong 
client's provider management capability can prevent providers from behaving opportunistically 
which in turn can ensure clients achieve expected benefits. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 12a: In the presence of strong contractual governance, the relationship between 
client's provider management capability and economic benefits decreases. 
Hypothesis 12b: In the presence of strong relational governance, the relationship between client's 
provider management capability and economic benefits decreases.  
In summary, the model we are proposing, based on three theoretical perspectives (resource-
based theories, transaction cost economics, and relational exchange theories), hypothesizes that 
provider's service quality and client's economic benefits are affected by independent and joint 
effects of client's and provider's capabilities and the two prevailing governance mechanisms. The 
hypotheses in our research model are summarized in Table 8 below. 
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Table 8: Summary of Hypotheses in the Research Model 
# Hypothesis 
H1: PHRMC ->SQ (+) 
Provider's human resources management capability is 
positively related to its service quality. 
H2: PRMC -> SQ (+) 
Provider's risk management capability is positively related 
to its service quality. 
H3: PI -> SQ (+) 
Provider's innovativeness is positively related to its service 
quality. 
H4: CG -> SQ (+) 
Contractual governance positively influences service quality 
in outsourcing. 
H5: CG -> EB (+) 
Contractual governance positively influences client's 
economic benefits. 
H6: RG ->SQ (+) 
Relational governance positively influences service quality 
in outsourcing. 
H7: RG -> EB (+) 
Relational governance positively influences client's 
economic benefits. 
H8: CPMC -> EB (+) 
Client's provider management capability is positively 
related to its economic benefits achieved from an 
outsourcing relationship. 
H9: SQ -> EB (+) 
Provider's service quality is positively related to client's 
economic benefits achieved from an outsourcing 
relationship. 
H10a: CG*PHRMC -> SQ (-) 
In the presence of strong contractual governance, the 
relationship between provider's human resources 
management capability and service quality decreases. 
H10b: CG*PRMC -> SQ (-) 
In the presence of strong contractual governance, the 
relationship between provider's risk management capability 
and service quality decreases. 
H10c: CG*PI -> SQ (-) 
In the presence of strong contractual governance, the 
relationship between provider's innovativeness and service 
quality decreases. 
H11a: RG*PHRMC -> SQ (-) 
In the presence of strong relational governance, the 
relationship between provider's human resources 
management capability and service quality decreases. 
H11b: RG*PRMC -> SQ (-) 
In the presence of strong relational governance, the 
relationship between provider's risk management capability 
and service quality decreases. 
H11c: RG*PI -> SQ (-) 
In the presence of strong relational governance, the 
relationship between provider's innovativeness and service 
quality decreases. 
H12a: CPMC * CG -> EB (-) 
In the presence of strong contractual governance, the 
relationship between client's provider management 
capability and economic benefits decreases. 
H12b: CPMC * RG -> EB (-) 
In the presence of strong relational governance, the 
relationship between client's provider management 
capability and economic benefits decreases. 
Note: where PHRMC=Provider's Human Resources Management Capability, PRMC=Provider's Risk Management 
Capability, PI=Provider's Innovativeness, CG=Contractual Governance, RG=Relational Governance, CPMC=Client's 
Provider Management Capability, SQ=Service Quality, EB=Economic Benefits. 
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Chapter Four 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
4.1 Sample and Data 
 The current study utilizes a data set collected by International Association of Outsourcing 
Practitioners (IAOP) and a consulting company Global Sourcing Optimization Services (GSOS) 
between 2009 and 2012, to empirically test our research model. IAOP and GSOS developed a 
commercial software named Value Health Check Survey (VHCS) for outsourcing clients and 
providers to self-evaluate the health of their outsourcing relationships. Commonly, a client firm 
purchases the VHCS license and then invites provider(s) to take the survey regarding an ongoing 
outsourcing arrangement. Informants who are engaged in an outsourcing contract are selected to 
take the survey. In general, for a given outsourcing arrangement, multiple informants from the 
client firm and the provider firm take the survey. This method gathers data from multiple 
informants, and thus provides a comprehensive view of an outsourcing relationship (Goo et al. 
2009). In total, our sample has 306 respondents from 41 firms, among which 21 firms are clients 
and 20 firms are providers. Table 9 summarizes the data distribution of each contract in our sample. 
Table 9: Profile of Outsourcing Contracts 
Contract Client Provider Total 
Sourcing 
Type Date 
Service 
Function 
Contract 1 CLIENT1 5 PROVIDER1 4 9 ITO 2010 
Technology 
(Hardware, 
Software) 
Contract 2 CLIENT2 8 PROVIDER2 5 13 ITO 2012 
Engineering 
Services 
Contract 3 CLIENT3 5 PROVIDER3 5 10 ITO 2012 
Engineering 
Services 
Contract 4 CLIENT4 12 PROVIDER4 4 16 ITO 2011 
Engineering 
Services 
Contract 5 CLIENT4 10 PROVIDER5 2 12 ITO 2011 
Engineering 
Services 
Contract 6 CLIENT5 5 PROVIDER6 5 10 BPO 2010 
Engineering 
Services 
Contract 7 CLIENT5 5 PROVIDER7 5 10 ITO 2011 
Engineering 
Services 
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Table 9: Profile of Outsourcing Contracts 
Contract Client Provider Total 
Sourcing 
Type Date 
Service 
Function 
Contract 8 CLIENT6 12 PROVIDER8 13 25 BPO 2009 
Technology 
(Hardware, 
Software) 
Contract 9 CLIENT7 6 PROVIDER5 4 10 ITO 2009 
Financial 
Services 
(Insurance) 
Contract 10 CLIENT8 5 PROVIDER9 4 9 BPO 2011 
Engineering 
Services 
Contract 11 CLIENT9 5 PROVIDER10 4 9 BPO 2010 
Air 
Transportation 
Contract 12 CLIENT10 8 PROVIDER1 10 18 BPO 2009 Automotive 
Contract 13 CLIENT11 7 PROVIDER11 5 12 BPO 2011 
Engineering 
Services 
Contract 14 CLIENT12 4 PROVIDER12 3 7 BPO 2010 Other 
Contract 15 CLIENT7 5 PROVIDER13 5 10 ITO 2011 
Engineering 
Services 
Contract 16 CLIENT13 6 PROVIDER14 5 11 BPO 2011 
Engineering 
Services 
Contract 17 CLIENT14 16 PROVIDER15 15 31 BPO 2010 
Engineering 
Services 
Contract 18 CLIENT14 7 PROVIDER16 1 8 BPO 2010 
Engineering 
Services 
Contract 19 CLIENT15 6 PROVIDER17 4 10 ITO 2012 
Engineering 
Services 
Contract 20 CLIENT16 5 PROVIDER18 4 9 ITO 2012 
Engineering 
Services 
Contract 21 CLIENT17 5 PROVIDER4 5 10 BPO 2011 
Engineering 
Services 
Contract 22 CLIENT18 7 PROVIDER15 11 18 BPO 2012 
Engineering 
Services 
Contract 23 CLIENT19 5 PROVIDER19 4 9 BPO 2011 
Engineering 
Services 
Contract 24 CLIENT20 5 PROVIDER20 4 9 BPO 2009 
Retail and 
Consumer 
Goods 
Contract 25 CLIENT21 7   7 ITO 2009 
Financial 
Services 
(Banking, 
Markets) 
Contract 26 CLIENT21 4   4 ITO 2009 
Financial 
Services 
(Banking, 
Markets) 
Total  174  132 306    
 In Table 9, we give each firm a pseudonym in order to protect privacy of the firms. These 
41 firms are engaged in 26 contracts. Among these 26 contracts, two contracts only have the data 
from a same client firm--CLIENT21. The client firm CLIENT21 only asked its employees to take 
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the surveys and did not invite engaged providers in the Contract 25 and the Contract 26. For the 
majority of client firms, we only have data for one outsourcing contract, except four client firms. 
Client firms CLIENT4, CLIENT5, CLIENT7, and CLIENT14 took the VHCS with two contracted 
providers. Likewise, we have data from 16 provider firms engaged in one contract and four provider 
firms engaged in two contracts. More specifically, provider firms PROVIDER1, PROVIDER4, 
PROVIDER5, and PROVIDER15 took the VHCS with two client firms. Therefore, the 20 client 
firms and the 20 provider firms were engaged in 24 contracts. Table 10 summarizes the profile of 
participating firms. 
As exhibited in Table 10, the majority of the client firms and provider firms are large-cap 
firms. For instance, 80% of the client firms and provider firms have more than ten thousands 
employees. Also, more than 95% of the clients and 75% of provider firms have annual revenue 
greater than $1 billion.   
Table 10: Profile of the Responding Firms 
Total Number of Employees 
Number of Employees Client Firms Provider Firms 
Range Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Less than 5000 2 9.52% 2 10.00% 
5001-10000 1 4.76% 2 10.00% 
10001-50000 10 47.62% 8 40.00% 
50000-100000 5 23.81% 3 15.00% 
100000 and above 2 9.52% 5 25.00% 
Unanswered 1 4.76% 0 0.00% 
Total 21 100.00% 20 100.00% 
Total Sales Revenue 
Annual Revenue Client Firms Provider Firms 
Range Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
less than $1 billion 0 0.00% 5 25.00% 
$1 - $5 billion 5 23.81% 3 15.00% 
$5 - $10 billion 2 9.52% 5 25.00% 
$10 billion and above 13 61.90% 6 30.00% 
Unanwered 1 4.76% 1 5.00% 
Total 21 100.00% 20 100.00% 
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  In total, we have 306 informants, with 174 from client firms and 132 from provider firms. 
Table 11 shows the profile of informants. As illustrated in Table 11, over 80% of our informants 
were from the management team (e.g., CEO, CIO, COO, vice president, senior manager, 
relationship executive, service delivery executive), who appear to be the accurate source of 
information as regards management of outsourcing arrangements and outsourcing performance 
(Goo et al. 2009). Also, we have 121 informants who were engaged in ITO contracts and 185 
informants who were engaged in BPO contracts. A large percent (68%) of informants came from 
engineering services industry.  
Table 11: Profile of Informants (n=306) 
Characteristics Frequency Percentage 
Firms   
    Clients 175  57.2% 
    Providers 131 42.8% 
Sourcing Type   
ITO 121 39.5% 
    Applications Development and Maintenance 59  
    Data Center Operations 13  
    Help Desk/Call Center 29  
    Print & Fulfillment 20  
BPO 185 60.5% 
    Contact/Call Center 76  
    Financial & Accounting 28  
    Human Resources-Benefits 9  
    Other 72  
Types of Industry   
    Air Transportation 9 2.9% 
    Automotive 18 5.9% 
    Engineering Services 208 68.0% 
    Financial Services (Banking, Markets) 11 3.6% 
    Financial Services (Insurance) 10 3.3% 
    Retail and Consumer Goods 9 2.9% 
    Technology (Hardware, Software) 34 11.1% 
   Other 7 2.3% 
Title of Respondents   
   CEO/COO/President 4 1.3% 
   Vice President 24 7.8% 
   Manager/Senior Manager 102 33.3% 
   Director/Senior Director 61 19.9% 
   Program Manager 25 8.2% 
   Relationship Executive 16 5.2% 
   Service Delivery Executive 25 8.2% 
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Table 11: Profile of Informants (n=306) 
   Sales and/or Marketing Executive 1 0.3% 
   Non-Management/Analyst/Consultant 10 3.3% 
   Not Mentioned 37 12.1% 
 
4.2 Operationalization of Constructs 
 All constructs in this study are measured using multiple items with ten-point Likert scales. 
Table 12 summarizes measurement items used in this study. Since the wording of the VHCS survey 
questions are slightly different for client firms and provider firms. We include both versions in 
Table 12. 
Table 12: Measurement Items 
Factor Item Question Question Text 
Dependent Variables 
Service 
Quality 
(reflective 
construct) 
SQ1 
Client 
Version 
The supplier is responsive, flexible and adaptable to 
our changing business needs for capabilities in this 
business area. 
Provider 
Version 
We (the service provider) are responsive, flexible and 
adaptable to our client's changing needs for business 
capabilities as it relates to this contract/relationship. 
SQ2 
Client 
Version 
End-Users are satisfied with the quality of service 
provided by the supplier. 
Provider 
Version 
Our client's end-users are satisfied with the quality of 
service provided by us (the supplier). 
SQ3 
Client 
Version 
The supplier meets or exceeds current service levels 
agreements (SLA). 
Provider 
Version 
We meet or exceed current service levels agreements 
(SLA) with our client in this relationship. 
Economic 
Benefits 
(reflective 
construct) 
EB1 
Client 
Version 
We are realizing the business benefits from the 
outsourcing relationship as outlined in the original 
business case &/or contracts. 
Provider 
Version 
Our client is realizing the business benefits from the 
outsourcing relationship as outlined in the original 
business case &/or contracts. 
EB2 
Client 
Version 
We're getting the financial business value we should 
from this supplier. 
Provider 
Version 
Our client believes they are getting the financial 
business value they should from us (their supplier). 
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Table 12: Measurement Items 
Factor Item Question Question Text 
Independent Variables 
Relational 
Governance 
(reflective 
construct) 
RG1 
Client 
Version 
There is clarity between our key stakeholders and 
supplier concerning the current business value we 
expect from the outsourcing contract/relationship. 
Provider 
Version 
There is clarity between our client's key stakeholders 
and us concerning the current business value our client 
expects from the outsourcing contract/relationship. 
RG2 
Client 
Version 
Relationships with the supplier at all levels are strong 
and if they aren't, we can still make the relationship 
work. 
Provider 
Version 
Relationships with our client at all levels are strong and 
if they aren't, we can still make the relationship work. 
RG3 
Client 
Version 
There is clarity concerning supplier management 
practices, roles and responsibilities between our 
supplier and our key internal users and/or stakeholders. 
Provider 
Version 
There is clarity concerning supplier management 
practices, roles and responsibilities between us (the 
supplier) and our client's key internal users and/or 
stakeholders. 
RG4 
Client 
Version 
Our governance processes facilitate fast and effective 
resolution to problems regardless of the organizational 
levels involved. 
Provider 
Version 
Our client's governance processes facilitate fast and 
effective resolution to problems regardless of the 
organizational levels involved. 
Contractual 
Governance 
(reflective 
construct) 
CG1 
Client 
Version 
The contract terms with the supplier have sufficient 
protection to address fluctuations in currency value and 
inflation. 
Provider 
Version 
The contract terms with our client provide sufficient 
protection for them to address fluctuations in currency 
value and inflation. 
CG2 
 
Client 
Version 
The contract's financial terms/conditions compare 
favorably to current market best practices. 
Provider 
Version 
The contract's financial terms/conditions compare 
favorably to current market best practices. 
CG3 
Client 
Version 
The supplier is appropriately financially incented to 
deliver the business value we expect from outsourcing 
this business process/function. 
Provider 
Version 
We (the supplier) are appropriately financially incented 
to deliver the business value our client expects from 
outsourcing this business process/function. 
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Table 12: Measurement Items 
Factor Item Question Question Text 
Client's 
Provider 
Managemen
t 
Capabilities 
(reflective 
construct) 
CPMC1 
Client 
Version 
We have the necessary processes, tools and 
technologies in place to understand if we are getting 
the required capabilities from our supplier. 
Provider 
Version 
Our client has the necessary processes, tools and 
technologies in place to understand if they are getting 
the required capabilities from us (the service provider). 
CPMC2 
Client 
Version 
We have the processes, tools and technologies to easily 
monitor, manage and report on the business case 
realization of outsourcing. 
Provider 
Version 
Our client has the processes, tools and technologies to 
easily monitor, manage and report on the business case 
realization of outsourcing. 
CPMC3 
Client 
Version 
We have the necessary processes, tools and 
technologies in place to effectively and efficiently 
govern this outsourcing contract/relationship. 
Provider 
Version 
Our client has the necessary processes, tools and 
technologies in place to effectively and efficiently 
govern this outsourcing contract/relationship. 
Provider 
Human 
Resource 
Managemen
t Capability 
(reflective 
construct) 
PHRMC1 
Client 
Version 
The level of employee turnover in all key areas of the 
supplier's workforce relevant to this outsourcing 
contract are within acceptable ranges. 
Provider 
Version 
The level of employee turnover in all key areas of our 
(the service provider) workforce relevant to this 
contract are within acceptable ranges. 
PHRMC2 
Client 
Version 
The supplier has appropriate, recruiting, training and 
resource contingency plans in place to address current 
& future capabilities we need in this area. 
Provider 
Version 
We (the service provider) have the appropriate 
recruiting, training, and resource contingency plan in 
place to address current and future capabilities the 
client requires in this area. 
PHRMC3 
Client 
Version 
The supplier has acceptable quality controls policies 
and procedures in place for this outsourcing 
contract/relationship. 
Provider 
Version 
We (the supplier) have acceptable quality controls 
policies and procedures in place for this outsourcing 
relationship. 
Provider 
Risk 
Managemen
t Capability 
(reflective 
construct) 
PRMC1 
Client 
Version 
The supplier has adequate provisions in place to protect 
access to their systems that have access to our 
data/information/systems. 
Provider 
Version 
We (the service provider) have adequate provisions in 
place to protect access to our systems that have access 
to our client's data/information/systems. 
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Table 12: Measurement Items 
Factor Item Question Question Text 
PRMC2 
Client 
Version 
The supplier has contingency plans in place that are 
periodically tested to ensure they can deal with a crisis 
without significantly affecting our business. 
Provider 
Version 
We (the service provider) have contingency plans in 
place that are periodically tested to ensure we can deal 
with a crisis without significantly affecting our client's 
business. 
PRMC3 
Client 
Version 
The supplier is sensitive to the brand identity of our 
organization and demonstrates the importance of 
protecting the value of our brand. 
Provider 
Version 
We (the service provider) are sensitive to the brand 
identity and value of our client's organization and we 
demonstrate through our actions the importance of 
protecting the value of our client's brand. 
Provider 
Innovativen
ess 
(reflective 
construct) 
PI1 
Client 
Version 
The supplier is providing us with the appropriate level 
of innovation and creativity in addressing our current 
and future business needs. 
Provider 
Version 
We (the service provider) are providing our client with 
the appropriate level of innovation and creativity in 
addressing our client's current future business needs. 
PI2 
Client 
Version 
The supplier cooperates with cost reduction initiatives 
and is willing to be proactive about it. 
Provider 
Version 
We (the supplier) cooperate with cost reduction 
initiatives and are willing to be proactive about it. 
Provider's 
Business 
Risk 
(reflective 
construct, 
reverse 
items) 
PBR1 
Client 
Version 
The supplier's business is financially sound and there 
are no apparent threats to their operations which would 
cause us concern. 
Provider 
Version 
Our outsourcing business (the service provider's overall 
outsourcing business) is financially sound and there are 
no apparent threats or risks to our clients. 
PBR2 
Client 
Version 
The supplier is currently supporting us from regions of 
the world that are relatively free from political, 
economic or other forms of serious business risk. 
Provider 
Version 
We (the service provider) are currently supporting this 
client from regions of the world that are relatively free 
from political, economic and/or other forms of serious 
business risk. 
 Client's Provider Management Capability is conceptualized as a reflective construct in 
this study. It is measured using three items. More specifically, this construct measures whether a 
client firm has skilled employees to effectively monitor, coordinate, and evaluate an outsourcing 
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contract using necessary procedures, tools, and technologies (Ranganathan and Balaji 2007; 
Willcocks et al. 2007).  
 Provider Capabilities. Provider's human resource management capability refers to 
capability of a provider firm to identify, recruit, train, assign, and retain talents in order to achieve 
expected outsourcing objectives (Lacity et al. 2010; Levina and Ross 2003). We operate it as a 
reflective construct and use three items to measure it. Provider's risk management capability refers 
to capability of a provider firm to identify, rate, rank, and mitigate potential outsourcing risks 
(Lacity et al. 2011a). Three items are used to measure this reflective construct. Provider 
Innovativeness refers to a provider’s capability to deliver continuous improvement, new 
technologies, or new business processes to clients with structured processes and quality control 
policies in place (Lacity and Willcocks 2013). It is operated as a reflective construct and measured 
by two items. 
 Governance mechanisms. Contractual governance is defined as governance of 
outsourcing relationship through written contracts and legal provisions (Rai et al. 2012). We 
conceptualize contractual governance as a reflective construct and measure it with three items. 
Particularly, we measure the degree to which an outsourcing contract has appropriate incentives for 
providers, reflect best practices in the current market, and address financial crisis. Relational 
governance is defined as govern of outsourcing relationship through social processes that promote 
shared norms (Goo et al. 2009; Poppo and Zenger 2002). We also operationalize relational 
governance as a reflective construct and use three items to measure it.  
 Outsourcing Performance in this study is assessed in terms of provider's service quality 
and client's economic benefits. Service quality refers to perceived service performance delivered 
by a provider (Lacity et al. 2010). We operationalize service quality as a reflective construct 
measured by three items. Economic benefits refers to the degree to which client firms achieve 
expected financial values. This construct is conceptualized as a reflective construct and measured 
by two items. 
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 Control Variables. We incorporate two control variables that influence outsourcing 
performance in this study: business risk of provider firm and industry type. In general, business risk 
is defined as the probability of an action that will adversely affect a firm's business (Lacity et al. 
2009). Prior literature has shown that provider's business risk has negative impact on both 
outsourcing decision (e.g., Benamati and Rajkumar 2002; Clark et al. 1995; Smith and McKeen 
2004) and outsourcing performance (e.g., Atesci et al. 2010; Wüllenweber et al. 2008). A variety 
of risks may exist in provider firms. One is country-level risks such as turbulence in the 
environment and instability in political and economic policies. Another one is firm-specific risks 
such as unsound financial condition or threats to operations. With high level of business risk, 
providers may have to allocate resources to manage them, thus, reducing the quality of service. In 
addition, clients cannot just bypass all the risk mitigation responsibilities to providers. They would 
have to invest more in contract monitoring, or even renegotiating outsourcing contracts. Therefore, 
economic benefits of clients could be reduced. In this study, we are interested in knowing whether 
high level of business risk leads to poor outsourcing performance. Provider’s business risk is 
conceptualized as a reflective construct and measured by two items. 
 We also examine the control effect of industry type on the outsourcing performance. Many 
researchers have found that outsourcing performance varies in different industries (e.g., Beasley et 
al. 2009; Hutzschenreuter et al. 2011; Kenyon and Meixell 2011; Mani et al. 2010). For example, 
Mani et al. (2010) find that financial services industry has lower level of satisfaction with 
outsourcing services compared to retail industry. We control industry type to know whether 
outsourcing performance in our model depend on industry type. The industry type is coded as a 
categorical variable. 
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Chapter Five  
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
 This study adopts a two-stage analysis for data analysis, in which the measurement model 
is first assessed, and then structural model is estimated in the second stage. We conduct data 
analysis primarily using structural equation modeling. PLS-graph 3.0 and LISREL8.53 are used for 
confirmatory factor analysis and PLS-Graph 3.0 is used for hypotheses testing. In addition, we also 
use SPSS 20.0 for exploratory factor analysis and STATA 13.1 for robustness test.  
 
5.1 Measurement Models Assessment    
 Because some of our measurement items are newly developed, we followed the validation 
guidelines of Lewis et al. (2005) to conduct exploratory assessment and confirmatory assessment 
first and then followed the guidelines of Straub et al. (2004) to validate measurement instrument.  
 Before we conduct factor analysis, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test and Bartlett's 
sphericity test are executed to ensure that we have amenable data for factor analysis and the original 
correlation matrix is not an identity matrix (Lewis et al. 2005). For the KMO test, as recommended 
by Kaiser (1974) and Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999), a value of 0.5 is the minimum, a value of 
0.5 to 0.7 is medium, a value of 0.7 to 0.8 is good, a value of 0.8 to 0.9 is great, and a value above 
0.9 is superb.  We have a value of 0.94 for the KMO test which indicates that our sample size is 
large enough for factor analysis. Bartlett's sphericity test was used to test whether the correlation 
matrix is an identity matrix (Dziuban and Shirkey 1974). An identity matrix indicates that variables 
in a dataset are unrelated and thereof unsuitable for structure detection (Dziuban and Shirkey 1974). 
Our Barlett's sphericity test had a value smaller than 0.05 which indicates that factor analysis is 
useful for our data.  
5.1.1 Exploratory Factor Analysis 
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 Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was used to empirically derive the initial set of 
measurement items for the constructs. We assess the measurement model using EFA with principal 
component analysis for dependent variables and independent variables separately. The results of 
EFA is summarized in Table 13 for dependent variables and in Table 14 for independent variables.  
Table 13: EFA Results for Outsourcing Outcome Variables 
Construct Item Service Quality Economic Benefits 
Service 
Quality 
SQ1 .95 -0.17 
SQ2 .75 0.11 
SQ3 .73 0.22 
Economic 
Benefits 
EB1 0.02 .86 
EB2 -0.04 .85 
 
Table 14: EFA Results for Predictor Variables 
Item 
Relational 
Governance 
Provider's 
Risk 
Management 
Capability 
Provider's 
HR 
Management 
Capability 
Client's 
Provider 
Management 
Capability 
Contractual 
Governance 
Provider's 
Business 
Risk 
Provider's 
Innovativeness 
RG1 0.75 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.23 -0.04 
RG2 0.74 0.07 0.17 -0.06 0.03 -0.17 0.05 
RG3 0.71 0.11 -0.07 0.04 0.09 -0.19 0.18 
RG4 0.59 -0.2 0.41 0.01 0.13 -0.13 -0.04 
PRMC1 -0.11 0.81 0.11 0.07 0.15 0.08 -0.2 
PRMC2 0.03 0.73 0.08 0.01 0.13 -0.05 0.03 
PRMC3 0.47 0.62 -0.12 -0.02 -0.25 0.11 0 
PHRMC1 0.01 -0.01 0.82 0.03 -0.15 -0.01 0.25 
PHRMC2 0.08 0.14 0.7 0.07 -0.1 0.08 0.11 
PHRMC2 0.09 0.23 0.53 -0.1 0.2 -0.04 0.17 
CPMC1 -0.28 0.1 0.27 0.89 -0.12 0.02 -0.01 
CPMC2 0.27 -0.08 -0.38 0.7 0.06 0.14 0.11 
CPMC3 0.25 0.05 0.14 0.63 0.03 -0.2 -0.04 
CG1 -0.2 0.15 -0.23 0 0.77 -0.05 0.33 
CG2 0.19 0.06 -0.02 -0.11 0.77 0.08 -0.12 
CG3 0.18 -0.11 0.1 0.18 0.53 0.19 -0.11 
PBR1 -0.16 0.02 -0.08 0.02 0.05 0.86 0.19 
PBR2 0.04 0.11 0.29 -0.05 0.1 0.59 -0.08 
PI1 -0.01 -0.09 0.32 0.1 0.08 0.03 0.73 
PI2 0.23 -0.1 0.28 -0.1 -0.08 0.24 0.64 
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 As shown in Table 13 and Table 14, all the measurement items have factor loadings greater 
than 0.5 on the desired construct, which is a recommended cutoff point used in literature (e.g., Chi 
et al. 2005; Jones and Leonard 2008; Straub 1989). In addition, all the measurement items load low 
on the other constructs. That also infers that each item loads on only one factor. Therefore, our EFA 
results has empirically confirmed our conceptualization of constructs. 
5.1.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
  Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) “provides an appropriate means of assessing the 
efficacy of measurement among scale items and the consistency of a pre-specified structural 
equation model with its associated network of theoretical concepts” (Segars and Grover 1998, 
p.148). We assess CFA for dependent variables and independent variables separately using PLS-
Graph 3.0. More specifically, we assess convergent validity, discriminant validity, and composite 
reliability in these two measurement models (Bagozzi and Phillips 1982; Chin 1995; 1998; Gefen 
and Straub 2005; Straub et al. 2004). 
5.1.2.1 Measurement Model 1: Dependent Variables (DVs) 
 Convergent Validity is the extent to which measurement items of a construct converge 
(Campbell and Fiske 1959). It is evidenced when measurement items show significant and high 
correlations with one another on assigned construct (Straub et al. 2004). We assess the convergent 
validity using factor loadings and t-value. As shown in the Table 15, all the factor loadings of 
service quality and economic benefits are 0.7 or above with t-values greater than 1.96, indicating 
good convergent validity of constructs (Barclay et al. 1995; Gefen et al. 2000; Gefen and Straub 
2005; Hair et al. 2006). In addition, all the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) scores are above 
their suggested threshold of 0.5 (Chin et al. 2003; Gefen et al. 2000).   
Discriminant Validity refers to the distinctness of constructs (Lewis et al. 2005). 
Discriminant validity is inferred when measurement items load high on desired construct but low 
on other constructs (Segars and Grover 1998). Therefore, we conduct items-to-construct 
correlations analysis first. The results in Table 15 indicate that all the items load high on expected 
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construct and low on the other one. In addition, we compare the square root of each construct AVE 
to its correlations with the other constructs -- each construct's square root of AVE should be greater 
than its correlations with all the other constructs (Gefen et al. 2000; Gefen and Straub 2005). The 
results in Table 15 also shows that all the constructs have an AVE square root larger than its 
correlation with any other construct. Therefore, our dependent variable measurement model 
demonstrates good discriminant validity. 
Table 15: Convergent and Discriminant Validity of DVs Measurement Model (n=306) 
Construct Item Loadings 
t-
value 
Item-to-
Construct 
correlations 
Composite 
Reliability 
AVE 
(Square 
of AVE) 
Correlation 
SQ EB SQ EB 
Service 
Quality 
(SQ) 
SQ1 0.82 28.07 0.82 0.52 
0.87 
0.69 
(0.83) 
1  SQ2 0.84 33.26 0.84 0.54 
SQ3 0.84 39.13 0.84 0.47 
Economic 
Benefits 
(EB) 
EB1 0.86 52.19 0.51 0.86 
0.85 
0.74 
(0.86) 
0.6
1 
1 
EB2 0.86 52.19 0.54 0.86 
 
 Reliability refers to the degree to which measurement items of a construct are stable and 
consistent across different samples (Lewis et al. 2005). Reliability of dependent variables 
measurement model was evaluated using composite reliability. As exhibited in Table 15, all the 
outcome constructs have composite reliability exceeding the recommended threshold of 0.7 (Gefen 
et al. 2000; Hair et al. 2006). 
5.1.2.2 Measurement Model 1: Independent Variables (IVs) 
 Convergent Validity. We use20 items to measure six predictor constructs and one control 
variable, i.e., client's provider management capabilities (three items), provider's human resource 
management capability (three items), provider's risk management capability (three items), 
provider's innovativeness (two items), contractual governance (three items), relational governance 
(four items), and provider's business risk (two items). Convergent validity of IVs are also evaluated 
using factor loadings and t-statistics. As summarized in Table 16, all the items have factor loadings 
0.7 or above and t-statistics greater than 1.96. All of these indicate good convergent validity of the 
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measurement model. Also, even the smallest AVE is 0.57, exceeding the recommended cutoff of 
0.50 (Chin et al. 2003; Gefen et al. 2000). AVE indicates the average variance of construct extracted 
by the items. For instance, the AVE of contractual governance is 0.57. This indicates that 57% 
variances of contractual governance construct are extracted by the three measurement items. 
Table 16: Convergent Validity of IVs Measurement Model (n=306) 
Construct Item Loadings t-value 
Item 
mean 
S.D. 
Composite 
Reliability 
AVE 
Client's provider 
management 
capabilities 
CPMC1 0.80 34.06 4.48 2.57 
0.84 0.63 CPMC2 0.77 21.49 4.19 2.64 
CPMC3 0.82 35.31 4.75 2.85 
Provider's human 
resource management 
capability 
PHRMC1 0.90 83.21 4.88 2.65 
0.90 0.75 PHRMC2 0.85 36.33 5.03 2.87 
PHRMC3 0.84 36.13 5.39 2.78 
Provider's risk 
management 
capability 
PRMC1 0.85 29.14 5.72 3.39 
0.86 0.67 PRMC2 0.75 23.32 6.06 3.04 
PRMC3 0.85  30.01 4.97 3.18 
Provider's 
innovativeness 
PI1 0.90 74.38 4.38 2.45 
0.89 0.81 
PI2 0.90 74.38 5.00 2.95 
Contractual 
governance 
CG1 0.78 25.97 3.86 3.04 
0.80 0.57 CG2 0.71 15.95 3.33 3.34 
CG3 0.77 19.82 4.41 2.93 
Relational governance 
RG1 0.77 19.82 5.05 2.43 
0.87 0.62 
RG2 0.83 42.90 5.83 2.63 
RG3 0.78 27.56 5.24 2.38 
RG4 0.76 20.12 4.85 2.59 
Provider's Business 
risk 
PBR1 0.84 48.61 4.93 3.04 
0.83 0.71 
PBR2 0.84 48.61 5.43 3.28 
 
 Discriminant validity of measurement model for independent variables was also evaluated 
using two tests: (1) Test 1:  calculating the Item-to-Construct correlations, and (2) Test 2: 
comparing the square root of each construct AVE to its correlations with the other construct. Table 
17 and Table 18 summarize the testing results of Test 1 and Test 2 respectively. As shown in Table 
17: all the items load 0.7 or greater on their assigned construct but lower on other constructs. Also, 
all the measurement items of IVs have squared AVE greater than its correlation with any other 
construct as shown in Table 18. The results of these two tests demonstrate good discriminant 
validity of IVs measurement model. 
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 Reliability of independent variables measurement model was assessed using composite 
reliability. As indicated in Table 16, all the predictor constructs and the control variable have a 
composite reliability greater than 0.70.  
Table 17: Item-to-Construct Correlations of IVs 
Construct Item CPMC PHRMC PRMC PI CG RG PBR 
Client's Provider 
Management Capabilities 
(CPMC) 
CPMC1 .80  0.43 0.38 0.35 0.38 0.35 0.30 
CPMC2 0.77 0.24 0.28 0.33 0.37 0.38 0.22 
CPMC3 0.82 0.45 0.39 0.38 0.41 0.54 0.23 
Provider's Human 
Resource Management 
Capability (PHRMC) 
PHRMC1 0.36 0.85 0.46 0.54 0.27 0.51 0.40 
PHRMC2 0.46 0.90 0.59 0.59 0.34 0.59 0.50 
PHRMC3 0.41 0.84 0.59 0.53 0.47 0.54 0.43 
Provider's Risk 
Management Capability 
(PRMC) 
PRMC1 0.36 0.51 0.85 0.35 0.50 0.36 0.46 
PRMC2 0.33 0.50 0.75 0.47 0.29 0.54 0.42 
PRMC3 0.39 0.54 0.85 0.46 0.46 0.42 0.40 
Provider's Innovativeness 
(PI) 
PI1 0.44 0.57 0.47 0.90 0.41 0.48 0.36 
PI2 0.35 0.58 0.46 0.90 0.26 0.52 0.46 
Contractual governance 
(CG) 
CG1 0.36 0.37 0.41 0.27 0.78 0.35 0.28 
CG2 0.29 0.19 0.31 0.22 0.71 0.17 0.20 
CG3 0.45 0.40 0.43 0.36 0.77 0.46 0.35 
Relational governance 
(RG) 
RG1 0.41 0.44 0.46 0.44 0.30 0.77 0.38 
RG2 0.40 0.51 0.54 0.45 0.35 0.83 0.26 
RG3 0.46 0.44 0.47 0.45 0.39 0.78 0.27 
RG4 0.41 0.50 0.52 0.41 0.34 0.76 0.24 
Provider's Business Risk 
(PBR) 
PBR1 0.21 0.32 0.37 0.34 0.24 0.22 0.84 
PBR2 0.32 0.55 0.51 0.42 0.37 0.39 0.84 
 
Table 18: Square Root of Each Construct's AVE and Correlations for IVs* 
CORR/SQRT(AVE) CPMC PHRMC PRMC PI CG RG PBR 
Client's Provider Management 
Capabilities (CPMC) 0.79       
Provider's Human Resource 
Management Capability (PHRMC) 0.45 0.86      
Provider's Risk Management 
Capability (PRMC) 0.47 0.63 0.82     
Provider's Innovativeness (PI) 0.44 0.6 0.52 0.90    
Contractual governance (CG) 0.49 0.43 0.51 0.37 0.75   
Relational governance (RG) 0.53 0.63 0.53 0.56 0.44 0.79  
Provider's business Risk (BR) 0.31 0.51 0.52 0.45 0.37 0.37 0.84 
*Note: the square roots of AVE are placed on the diagonal. 
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5.1.3 Assessment of Common Method Variance 
 Common method bias may occur when the data are collected through only one method or 
through different methods but only at one point in time (Campbell and Fiske 1959). Thus, the 
variance is accounted for more by the data collection method rather than by the desired constructs 
(Podsakoff et al. 2003). The data for this study was collected using a single method - survey. Thus, 
common method bias may be a source of concern. We perform Harman's single-factor test using 
both exploratory factor analysis (EFA) approach and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) approach 
(Narayanan et al. 2011; Sabherwal and Becerra-Fernandez 2005) to estimate the degree of common 
method bias (Podsakoff et al. 2003).  
 When assessed using EFA approach, we put all the 25 items to a single factor. If 
considerable common method variance exists, either a single factor would emerge or the first factor 
would explain the majority of variances. The first factor explained 22.48% of the variances and no 
general factor emerged. We use LISREL 8.53 to assess common method variance with CFA 
approach, a single factor model with all the 25 items was assessed. This single factor model 
exhibited a poor fit with the data (chi-square to degrees of freedom ratio of 5.55, RMSEA=0.122, 
GFI=0.73, AGFI=0.68), as compared to the measurement model for dependent variables (chi-
square to degrees of freedom ratio of 1.34, RMSEA=0.033, GFI=0.99, AGFI=0.97) and the 
measurement model for independent variables (chi-square to degrees of freedom ratio of 2.00, 
RMSEA=0.057, GFI=0.92, AGFI=0.88). Thus, the results suggest that common method bias 
doesn't present in either of the measurement model.  
 
5.2 Structural Model Assessment 
 We apply PLS-Graph 3.0 to test the hypotheses. PLS is a prediction-oriented research 
model (Fornell and Bookstein 1982; Peng and Lai 2012). It aims to evaluate “the extent to which 
one part of the research model predicts values in other parts of the research model” (Peng and Lai 
2012, p.468). As suggested by Peng and Lai (2012), when the research is exploratory and complex 
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and there is no well-established theory to support hypothesized relationships, PLS could be a 
suitable analysis tool. In addition, prior literature also suggests that PLS is a suitable tool for testing 
the significance level of interaction effects (Helm et al. 2010).  For these reasons, we select PLS as 
our analysis tool for structural model testing. Table 19 presents descriptive statistics for constructs 
used in the research model. 
Table 19: Descriptive statistics for entire sample (n=306) 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation 
Service quality 5.53 2.17 
Economic benefits 4.74 2.54 
Provider's human resources management capability 5.1 2.39 
Provider's risk management capability 5.58 2.63 
Provider's innovativeness 4.69 2.43 
Client's provider management capability 4.47 2.04 
Contractual governance 3.86 2.33 
Relational governance 5.24 1.97 
 
5.2.1 Control Variables 
 We first assess the impact of the two control: industry type and business risk of provider 
firm. Industry type was coded as a categorical variable. More specifically, the engineering services 
industry where a large percent of informants come from, was coded 0 as the reference industry, air 
transportation industry was coded as 1, automotive industry was coded as 2, financial services 
industry was coded as 3, retail and consumer goods industry was coded as 4, technology (hardware, 
software) industry was coded as 5, and "Other" industries was coded as 6. 
 The effects of other industries on the outsourcing performance are compared with those of 
the reference industry. We also consider the interactions between business risk and service function 
to see if there are any significant interaction effects on outsourcing performance. Table 20 presents 
the testing results of control variables. 
As shown in Table 20, the two control variables and their interaction effects explain 40.82% 
variances of service quality and 27.63% variances of economic benefits. The results indicate that 
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outsourcing performance does vary in different industries. Compared to the reference industry 
engineering services, financial services and retail and consumer goods industries have significant 
lower values of service quality and economic benefits. That is, these two service functions achieved 
poorer outsourcing performance compared to those of engineering services. Interestingly, air 
transportation industry can generate more economic benefits for clients compared to engineering 
services industry. Provider's business risk has significant and negative effects on both the service 
quality and economic benefits. 
Table 20: Testing Results of Controls Variables 
Control Variables Service Quality 
(R2=40.82%) 
Economic 
Benefits 
(R2=27.63%) 
Service Function Standardized 
Coefficient 
(beta) 
Standardized 
Coefficient (beta) 
Air Transportation (Industry 1) 0.11 0.26** 
Automotive (Industry 2) -0.04 0.03 
Financial Services (Industry 3) -0.61** -0.35** 
Retail and Consumer Goods 
(Industry 4) 
-0.49** -0.30** 
Technology (Hardware, 
Software) (Industry 5) 
-0.07 0.11 
Other(Industry6) -0.02 0.34 
 
Provider's Business Risk (PBR) -0.50** -0.32** 
 
Interactions   
Industry 1*PBR -0.07 -0.21** 
Industry 2*PBR 0.11 0.05 
Industry 3*PBR 0.32** 0.05 
Industry 4*PBR 0.38** 0.28 
Industry 5*PBR 0.17 0.01 
Industry 6*PBR 0.11 -0.25 
Note: 1. ** p-value <0.05; 2. two regressions are conducted in STATA: service quality/Economic benefits=const + 
beta1*Industry + beta2*PBR + beta3*Industry*PBR; 3. All the coefficients are standardized, the constant for service 
quality is 7.61 and for economic benefits is 6.19.  
 
 Regarding the interaction effects, the negative impact of business risk on service quality 
was higher in financial services and retail and consumer goods industries as compared to 
engineering services industry. However, considering the client's economics benefits, the negative 
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impact of business risk was smaller in the air transportation industry as compared to the engineering 
services industry.  
5.2.2 Main Effects and Interactions 
 We apply the PLS product-indicator approach recommended by Chin et al. (2003) to test 
the interaction effects, which examines the main effects and interaction effects simultaneously in a 
test. All the measurement items are standardized before calculating the product terms. We add the 
two-way interaction into the main effects model one at a time as recommended by Rai et al. (2012). 
Besides the interactions proposed in our research model, we also test the interaction effects of (1) 
client's provider management capability and three provider's capabilities, (2) contractual 
governance and relational governance, and (3) client's provider management capability and service 
quality on economic benefits. In total, 12 interactions are tested for service quality and 13 
interaction are tested for economic benefits. Further, we add a dummy variable to control whether 
the informant is from client firm or provider firm, with 1 indicating client firm and 0 indicating 
provider firm. The testing results for service quality and economics benefits are summarized in 
Table 21 and Table 22 respectively.  
 We also conduct bootstrapping procedures for all the models to assess standard errors and 
significance level of parameter estimates (Chin 1998), in that “PLS lacks a classical parametric 
inferential framework” (Peng and Lai 2012, P.468). The default re-sampling setting in the PLS-
Graph 3.0 is 100 times. However, the recommended number of bootstrap samples has increased in 
the literature (Chin 1998; Peng and Lai 2012). For instance, Peng and Lai (2012) recommend re-
sampling 200 to 500 times and Chin (1998) recommends re-sampling 500 times. Therefore, we 
perform bootstrapping by re-sampling 300 times. The results in the Table 21 and Table 22 are 
bootstrapped using the re-sampling scheme of 300 times.  
 For those models having significant interactions, we also calculate effect sizes of the 
interaction terms using Cohen's f2. Effect size is “the strength of the theoretical relationship found 
in an analysis and provides an estimation of the degree to which a phenomenon exists in a 
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population” (Chin et al. 2003, p.195), whereas it has been rarely reported in the extant literature 
(Chin et al. 2003). The following formula is used to calculate effect size: 
𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑛′𝑠 ƒ2 =
𝑅2(𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙) − 𝑅2(𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙)
1 − 𝑅2(𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙)
 
 As suggested by Cohen (1988), effect size of 0.02 is considered small, of 0.15 is moderate, 
and of 0.35 is large. All of our significant interaction terms have effect sizes between small and 
moderate. It is very important for us to understand that a small effect size doesn't certainly imply 
an unimportant effect (Chin et al. 2003). A small interaction effect can also be meaningful when 
the consequential beta changes are meaningful (Chin et al. 2003).  Consider an example in this 
study, as shown in Table 21, relational governance has a standardized beta of 0.39 to service quality, 
provider's human resource management capability has a standardized beta of 0.23 to service quality, 
and they together have an interaction effect of -0.13 to service quality. Therefore, these results 
imply that one standard deviation increase in relational governance will not only impact service 
quality by 0.23, but it would also decrease the impact of provider's human resource management 
capability on service quality from 0.39 to 0.26. This result is meaningful. It indicates that with the 
presence of strong relational governance, the impact of provider's human resources management 
capability on service quality decreases. 
 By including all the main effects of capabilities and governance mechanisms, we are able 
to explain 72.80% variances of service quality and 53.60% variances of economic benefits. More 
specifically, provider's human resources management capability, provider's risk management 
capability, provider's innovativeness, and relational governance have positive and significant 
effects on service quality. However, contractual governance doesn't significantly affect provider's 
service quality. Therefore, H1, H2, H3, H6 are supported, but H4 is not supported. Also, contractual 
governance, relational governance, client's provider management capability, and service quality 
have positive and significant effects on economic benefits. These are consistent with H5, H7, H8, 
and H9 respectively. Thus, H5, H7, H8, and H9 are supported. 
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  Models 2-13 in Table 21 and Model 2-14 in Table 22 show the results of adding in the 
two-way interactions one at a time. As indicated in Table 21, the significant negative interactions 
between relational governance and provider's human resources management capability, and 
between relational governance and provider's risk management capability are consistent with H11a 
and H11b. In addition, the interactions between contractual governance and provider's 
innovativeness, and relational governance and provider's innovativeness also have weak but 
significant negative effects (0.05<p-value<0.1) on service quality. Thus, among our hypothesized 
interaction effects for service quality, H11a and H11b are supported, H10c and H11c are marginally 
supported, and H11b and H11c are not supported. Also, as shown in Table 22, only the interaction 
between client's provider management capability and contractual governance has a weak but 
significant negative effect on economic benefits. Hence, H12a is marginally supported, and H12b 
is not supported. Last, except the hypothesized interactions, the interaction between client's 
provider management capability and provider's innovativeness has a significant negative effect on 
service quality.  
 To provide a nuanced understanding of the pattern of each interaction effect, we follow the 
method used in Rai et al. (2012) to plot the interaction effects and calculate the significance level 
of simple slopes (see Figure 4 and Table 23). More specifically, we first plot the interaction effects 
at two levels of the moderator (low: one standard deviation below the moderator mean, and high: 
one standard deviation above the moderator mean). Then we use the formula recommended by 
Aiken et al. (1991) to calculate the simple slopes and their significance at each of these two level. 
The simple slopes and their significance levels at each level of moderator are calculated using the 
following two formulas (Aiken et al 1991; Rai et al. 2012): 
     𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒 = 𝑏1 + 𝑏3 ∗ 𝑍 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 (𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) =
𝑏1 + 𝑏3 ∗ 𝑍
√𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑏1) + 2 ∗ 𝑍 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑏1, 𝑏3) + 𝑍2 ∗ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑏3)
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Here Z refers to the value of the moderator variable at different level, 𝑏1 is the unstandardized 
regression coefficient of predictor variable, not moderator variable;  𝑏3 refers to the unstandardized 
coefficient of interaction term; 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑏1)   refers to the variance 
of  𝑏1, 𝑖. 𝑒. , (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑏1)
2 , 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑏1, 𝑏3)  refers to the covariance 
between  𝑏1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏3 , and 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑏3)  refers to the variance of  𝑏3,
𝑖. 𝑒. , (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑏3)
2.  
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Table 21: Estimates of Structural Path Coefficients (Dependent Variable: Service Quality) 
Predictor 
Constructs 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
DummyCOrP+ -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
CPMC -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 
PHRMC 0.23** 0.22** 0.23** 0.23** 0.23** 0.24** 0.23** 0.23** 0.22** 0.22** 0.23** 0.23** 0.23** 
PRMC 0.14** 0.14** 0.12** 0.14** 0.14** 0.14** 0.14** 0.14** 0.14** 0.14** 0.12** 0.14** 0.14** 
PI 0.23** 0.24** 0.23** 0.22** 0.23** 0.23** 0.23** 0.24** 0.24** 0.23** 0.23** 0.23** 0.23** 
 RG 0.42** 0.41** 0.43** 0.43** 0.42** 0.42** 0.40** 0.43** 0.39** 0.41** 0.42** 0.41** 0.42** 
CG -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 
CPMC*PHRMC  -0.07            
CPMC*PRMC   -0.07           
CPMC*PI    -0.09**          
CG*RG     0.04         
CPMC*CG      0.03        
CPMC*RG       -0.09       
PHRMC*CG        0.02      
PHRMC*RG         -0.13**     
PRMC*CG          0.09    
PRMC*RG           -0.09**   
PI*CG            -0.08*  
PI*RG             -0.09* 
Adjusted R 
square 
72.80% 73.30% 73.30% 73.60% 72.90% 72.90% 73.60% 72.90% 74.50% 73.60% 73.60% 73.40% 73.60% 
Cohen f2    0.03     0.06  0.03 0.02 0.03 
Note: (1). ** p-value<0.05, *p-value<0.10. (2). CPMC=Client's provider management capability, PHRMC= Provider's human resources management capability, PRMC= 
Provider's risk management capability, PI= Provider's innovativeness, RG=Relational Governance, CG= Contractual Governance, (2) +: This is a dummy variable, clients are 
coded as 1 and providers are coded as 0. 
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Table 22: Estimates of Structural Path Coefficients (Dependent Variable: Economic Benefits) 
Predictor 
Constructs 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
DummyCOrP+ -0.08* -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.10** -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08* -0.07 -0.09* -0.06 
CPMC 0.20** 0.20** 0.20** 0.21** 0.20** 0.21** 0.20** 0.20** 0.21** 0.20** 0.20** 0.20** 0.21** 0.19** 
PHRMC -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.05 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 
PRMC -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
PI -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 
RG 0.31** 0.31** 0.32** 0.30** 0.30** 0.35** 0.32** 0.30** 0.32** 0.32** 0.32** 0.32** 0.32** 0.31** 
CG 0.17** 0.17** 0.17** 0.16** 0.17** 0.16** 0.16** 0.17** 0.17** 0.17** 0.18** 0.15** 0.17** 0.17** 
SQ 0.18** 0.17** 0.17** 0.17** 0.17** 0.19** 0.19** 0.18** 0.13 0.18** 0.14* 0.19** 0.16* 0.15* 
CPMC*PHRMC  -0.02             
CPMC*PRMC   -0.01            
CPMC*PI    0.07           
CG*RG     0.03          
CPMC*CG  
 
 
   -0.19*         
CPMC*RG       0.05        
PHRMC*CG        0.10       
PHRMC*RG         -0.09      
PRMC*CG          -0.01     
PRMC*RG           -0.10    
PI*CG            0.06   
PI*RG             -0.06  
CPMC*SQ              -0.11 
Adjusted R2 53.60% 53.60% 53.60% 54.00% 53.70% 56.60% 53.80% 54.50% 54.30% 53.60% 54.60% 53.90% 53.90% 55.20% 
Cohen's f2      0.06         
Note: (1). ** p-value<0.05, *p-value<0.10. (2). CPMC=Client's provider management capability, PHRMC= Provider's human resources management capability, PRMC= 
Provider's risk management capability, PI= Provider's innovativeness, RG=Relational Governance, CG= Contractual Governance, (2) +: This is a dummy variable, clients are 
coded as 1 and providers are coded as 0. 
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a: Contractual Governance and Provider's Innovativeness  (H10c) 
 
b: Relational Governance and Provider's Human Resources 
Management Capability (H11a) 
 
c: Relational Governance and Provider's Risk Management 
Capability (H11a) 
 
d: Relational Governance and Provider's Innovativeness  (H11c) 
 
e: Client's Provider Management Capability and Provider's 
Innovativeness 
 
f: Contractual Governance and Client's  Provider 
Management Capability (H12a) 
Figure 4: Interaction Effects on Outsourcing Performance 
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Table 23: Patterns of Interaction Effects on Outsourcing Performance 
Interaction 
Effect 
Predicator 
Variable 
Moderator 
Z=mean-1SD Z=mean+1SD 
Patterns of Interaction Effects 
Slope t-value Slop t-value 
H10c: PI*CG-> 
SQ (-) 
Provider's 
innovativeness 
Contractual 
governance 
0.66 13.66** 0.46 9.01** 
The significant positive effect of provider's 
innovativeness on service quality attenuates with 
increases in contractual governance, although the effect 
is still significant when contractual governance is high. 
H11a: 
PHRMC*RG-> 
SQ (-)  
Provider's 
human 
resources 
management 
capability 
Relational 
governance 
0.45 5.20** 0.31 3.50** 
The significant positive effect of provider's human 
resources management capability on service quality 
attenuates with increases in relational governance, 
although the effect is still significant when relational 
governance is high. 
H11b: 
PRMC*RG-> 
SQ(-) 
Provider's risk 
management 
capability 
Relational 
governance 
0.32 3.43** 0.17 1.78* 
The significant positive effect of provider's risk 
management capability on service quality attenuates 
with increases in relational governance and becomes 
marginally significant when relational governance is 
high. 
H11c: PI*RG-> 
SQ(-) 
Provider's 
innovativeness 
Relational 
governance 
0.42 9.66** 0.27 6.24** 
The significant positive effect of provider's 
innovativeness on service quality attenuates with 
increases in relational governance, although the effect 
is still significant when relational governance is high. 
H12a: 
CPMC*CG-> 
EB(-) 
Client's 
provider 
management 
capability 
Contractual 
governance 
0.6 7.03** 0.44 5.32** 
The significant positive effect of client's provider 
management capability on economic benefits 
attenuates with increases in contractual governance, 
although the effect is still significant when contractual 
governance is high. 
CPMC*PI-> 
SQ (-) 
Provider's 
innovativeness 
Client's 
provider 
management 
capability 
0.59 11.93** 0.048 9.48** 
The significant positive effect of provider's 
innovativeness on service quality attenuates with 
increases in client's provider management capability, 
although the effect is still significant when relational 
governance is high. 
**p-value<0.05, p-value<0.1 
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5.2.3 Mediating Effect of Service Quality 
 We also examine the mediating effects of service quality on the relationships between three 
provider's capabilities and economic benefits. Provider's capabilities may affect economic benefits 
indirectly through its delivered service quality. 
 According to Baron and Kenny (1986), there are three rules for a variable to be a mediator: 
(1) mediator varies with levels of independent variables (IVs) (path a), (2) dependent variable (DV) 
varies with levels of mediator (path b), and (3) when path a and b are controlled, direct relation of 
IV to DV (path c) is no longer significant (fully mediated) or is significantly decreased (partially 
mediated).  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Service Quality Serves as a Mediator  
  
 Therefore, in order to test the mediating effect of service quality, three models are evaluated 
(see Figure 5): (1) paths from the three provider's capabilities to economic benefits, (2) paths from 
the three provider's capabilities to service quality, and (3) paths from both the three provider's 
capabilities and service quality to economic benefits. The testing results are summarized in Table 
24. As shown in Table 24, all the three provider's capabilities have significant effects on economic 
benefits as well as on service quality. However, when considering the effects of both service quality 
and provider's capabilities on economic benefits, the paths from these provider's capabilities to 
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economic benefits become insignificant. This indicates that the effects of provider's capabilities on 
service quality are fully mediated by service quality. 
Table 24: Testing Results of Mediating Effect of Service Quality 
Predictor 
DV: Economic benefits DV: Service quality DV: Economic benefits 
Coef. Standard 
error 
t-
value 
Coef. Standard 
error 
t-
value 
Coef. Standard 
error 
t-
value 
Provider's HR 
management 
Capability 
0.27** 0.09 2.94 0.36** 0.08 4.67 0.13 0.10 1.27 
Provider's risk 
management 
capability 
0.22** 0.08 2.75 0.25** 0.06 4.08 0.12 0.08 1.62 
Provider's 
innovativeness 
0.19** 0.08 2.57 0.31** 0.06 5.02 0.07 0.08 1.04 
Service 
quality 
      0.38** 0.09 4.16 
R2 35.1% 64.7% 40.6% 
**p-value<0.05 
 
 
 
5.3 Robustness Test of Research Model 
 
5.3.1 Test of Cluster Robustness of Measurement Model Using STATA 
 
 Since our data were collected from 306 informants in 41 firms which were engaged in 26 
outsourcing contracts, there might be intra-class correlations existing. Intra-class correlation 
indicates the correlation of the observations within a cluster (Shrout and Fleiss 1979; McGraw and 
Wong 1996). That is, the informants from the same firm might have answered the survey questions 
more similarly compared to the informants from other firms. Likewise, informants in a contract 
might also have answered the survey questions more similarly compared to informants in other 
contracts. The higher the intra-class correlation, the less unique information each informant in the 
same firm/contract provides. Therefore, we use the clustered robust standard errors to account for 
the intra-class correlation in the factor analysis and structural model testing (Handley and Benton 
2012). We conduct two cluster robust tests to examine whether our measurement model and 
structural model hold after considering intra-class correlations: one with cluster variable as firm 
and the other one with cluster variable as contract.  
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 The testing results of measurement model incorporating cluster robust standard errors are 
shown in Table 25. In the standard analysis where all the informants are assumed to be independent, 
all the items have significant factor loadings. Although some items have a factor loading lower than 
0.6, it is understandable because usually PLS has higher factor loadings than STATA. Also, the 
goal of robustness test is to see whether the measurement model holds after taking the intra-class 
correlations into consideration. As indicated in Table 25, in the test where cluster variable is firm, 
the model has 41 clusters. Factor loadings are the same as those in the standard analysis and all 
significant. But the standard errors are larger and t-value are smaller than those of the standard 
analysis. When the cluster variable is contract, the model has 26 clusters. The testing results are 
similar to the model with firm as cluster variable. Overall, two tests of cluster robust standard errors 
indicates that the measurement model is valid after accounting for the intra-class correlations. 
5.3.2 Test the Robustness of Structural Model Using STATA 
 We also test the robustness of structural model using cluster variables as firm and as 
contract. The main effects and interaction effects of governance mechanisms and capabilities on 
service quality and economic benefits are summarized in Table 26 and Table 27 respectively. As 
depicted in Table 26 and Table 27, most of the findings in our research model are robust after taking 
into account the intra-class correlations of informants in the same firm or informants engaged in 
the same contract. A slight variation in Table 26 is the interaction effect of provider's 
innovativeness and contractual governance on the service quality. It becomes less significant after 
considering the intra-class correlations among informants in a contract, with t-value changing from 
-2.10 to -1.76. 
 In table 27, the interaction effect of client's provider management capability and 
contractual governance on economic benefits also doesn't hold consistently in all the three tests. 
The interaction effect is only significant after accounting for the intra-class correlations among 
informants in a contract. These variation should be taken into account when interpreting the 
structural model testing results. 
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 Overall, the robustness tests indicate that our measurement model and the majority of our 
hypothesized relationships are robust considering intra-class correlations. Figure 6 summarizes the 
significant main effects and interaction effects in the research model.  
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Table 25: Robustness Test Results of Measurement Models 
Construct Item 
Standard Analysis Cluster Variable=Firm Cluster Variable=Contract 
Factor 
Loading 
Standard 
Error 
t-vale 
Factor 
Loading 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
t-vale 
Factor 
Loading 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
t-vale 
Economic Benefits 
EB1 0.68 0.04 15.35 0.68 0.09 7.69 0.68 0.08 8.63 
EB2 0.72 0.04 16.40 0.72 0.05 15.01 0.72 0.06 11.09 
Service Quality 
SQ1 0.72 0.04 19.55 0.72 0.11 6.87 0.72 0.08 8.90 
SQ2 0.76 0.03 22.04 0.76 0.04 18.01 0.76 0.05 15.78 
SQ3 0.72 0.04 19.61 0.72 0.04 16.75 0.72 0.06 12.21 
Relational Governance 
RG1 0.7 0.04 19.57 0.7 0.05 13.35 0.7 0.05 13.37 
RG2 0.76 0.03 23.71 0.76 0.03 22.68 0.76 0.04 17.06 
RG3 0.67 0.04 17.65 0.67 0.06 10.99 0.67 0.05 14.59 
RG4 0.68 0.04 18.49 0.68 0.06 10.81 0.68 0.05 14.10 
Provider's Risk 
Management Capability 
PRMC1 0.63 0.04 14.81 0.63 0.08 7.46 0.63 0.08 7.92 
PRMC2 0.76 0.03 22.97 0.76 0.04 18.76 0.76 0.04 18.63 
PRMC3 0.76 0.03 22.72 0.76 0.04 17.7 0.76 0.06 13.85 
Provider's Human 
Resources Management 
Capability 
PHRMC1 0.88 0.02 42.39 0.88 0.02 45.32 0.88 0.02 43.91 
PHRMC2 0.76 0.04 26.49 0.76 0.06 12.84 0.76 0.05 16.34 
PHRMC3 0.74 0.03 24.37 0.74 0.05 15.11 0.74 0.05 14.94 
Client's Provider 
Management Capability 
CPMC1 0.65 0.04 14.75 0.65 0.05 12.74 0.65 0.06 11.69 
CPMC2 0.59 0.05 12.53 0.59 0.09 6.75 0.59 0.09 6.86 
CPMC3 0.77 0.04 20.40 0.77 0.04 17.75 0.77 0.04 19.39 
Contractual 
Governance 
CG1 0.69 0.04 15.78 0.69 0.04 15.61 0.69 0.05 14.24 
CG2 0.61 0.05 12.93 0.61 0.06 9.61 0.61 0.06 10.35 
CG3 0.66 0.04 23.71 0.66 0.08 5.69 0.66 0.09 4.92 
Provider's 
Innovativeness 
PI1 0.76 0.04 21.30 0.76 0.06 12.86 0.76 0.06 12.60 
PI2 0.81 0.04 23.74 0.81 0.05 17.58 0.81 0.06 14.87 
Provider's Business 
Risk 
PBR1 0.79 0.05 15.34 0.79 0.05 16.07 0.79 0.05 15.00 
PBR2 0.52 0.05 10.11 0.52 0.10 5.29 0.52 0.08 6.22 
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Table 26: Cluster Robustness Test Results of Service Quality 
Predictor 
Standard Analysis Cluster Variable: Firm (n=41) Cluster Variable: Contract (n=26) 
Path 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Err. 
t-value 
Path 
Coefficien
t 
Robust 
Standard Err. 
t-
value 
Path 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard Err. 
t-
value 
Relational Governance 
(RG) 0.46** 0.05 9.48 0.46** 0.07 6.75 0.46**  0.05 8.57 
Contractual Governance 
(CG) -0.04 0.04 -1.21 -0.04 0.04 -0.98 -0.04 0.03 -1.24 
Client's Provider 
Management Capability 
(CPMC) -0.04 0.04 -1.04 -0.04 0.05 -0.91 -0.04 0.05 -0.96 
Provider's Human 
Resources Management 
Capability (PHRMC) 0.22** 0.04 5.07 0.22** 0.07 3.18 0.22** 0.07 2.94 
Provider's Risk 
Management Capability 
(PRMC) 0.13** 0.04 3.54 0.12** 0.05 2.78 0.12** 0.05 2.31 
Provider's 
Innovativeness (PI) 0.23** 0.04 6.02 0.23** 0.04 5.26 0.23** 0.05 4.77 
CPMC*PI -0.03** 0.01 -3.06 -0.03** 0.01 -2.79 -0.03** 0.01 -2.52 
PHRMC*RG -0.04** 0.01 -3.31 -0.04** 0.02 -2.62 -0.04** 0.02 -2.50 
PRMC*RG -0.04** 0.01 -3.06 -0.04** 0.02 -2.23 -0.04** 0.01 -2.57 
PI*RG -0.04** 0.01 -3.12 -0.04** 0.01 -2.86 -0.04** 0.01 -2.59 
PI*CG -0.02** 0.01 -2.10 -0.02** 0.01 -2.25 -0.02* 0.01 -1.76 
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Table 27: Cluster Robustness Test of Economic Benefits 
Predictor 
Standard Analysis Cluster Variable: Firm (n=41) 
Cluster Variable: Contract 
(n=26) 
Path 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Err. 
t-value 
Path 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard 
Err. 
t-value 
Path 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard 
Err. 
t-value 
Relational Governance (RG) 0.47** 0.07 6.39 0.47** 0.13 3.58 0.47** 0.12 3.88 
Contractual Governance (CG) 0.29** 0.11 2.69 0.29** 0.13 2.21 0.29** 0.11 2.70 
Client's Provider Management 
Capability (CPMC) 0.36** 0.10 3.57 0.36** 0.12 2.97 0.36** 0.12 3.01 
Provider's Human Resources 
Management Capability (PHRMC) 0.09 0.07 1.36 0.09 0.09 0.97 0.09 0.10 0.90 
Provider's Risk Management 
Capability (PRMC) 0.05 0.06 0.88 0.05 0.07 0.69 0.05 0.06 0.79 
Provider's Innovativeness (PI) 0.07 0.06 1.27 0.07 0.09 0.83 0.07 0.08 0.97 
Service Quality 0.23** 0.09 2.57 0.23** 0.09 2.44 0.23** 0.10 2.31 
CPMC*CG -0.03 0.02 -1.55 -0.03 0.02 -1.55 -0.03* 0.02 -1.77 
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Figure 6: Findings in the Research Model (n=306)
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5.4 Compare Client's and Provider's Perspectives 
 In order to answer the last research question, we test our research model with subsamples 
of client informants and provider informants. We have 175 informants from client firms and 131 
informants from provider firms. Table 28 summarizes the descriptive statistics for client informants 
and provider informants. It is interesting to observe that provider informants in general rated 
constructs higher than clients. Our ANOVA test results indicate that except client’s provider 
management capability and contractual governance, providers rated higher scores than clients for 
all the other constructs. Figure 7 and Figure 8 present the findings of client informants and provider 
informants respectively.  
Table 28: Descriptive Statistics for Client Informants and Provider Informants 
Variable 
Client informants 
(n=175) 
Provider 
informants (n=131) 
Mean Difference 
(provider’s – client’s) 
Mean STD Mean STD Value F-value 
Service quality 4.98 2.18 6.26 1.94 1.28 28.27*** 
Economic benefits 4.28 2.57 5.34 2.36 1.06 13.55*** 
Provider's human 
resources management 
capability 
4.35 2.31 6.1 2.13 1.75 45.94*** 
Provider's risk 
management capability 
4.63 2.51 6.86 2.13 2.23 64.93*** 
Provider's 
innovativeness 
3.88 2.28 5.18 2.2 1.3 53.11*** 
Client's provider 
management capability 
4.33 2.04 4.66 2.02 0.33 1.93 
Contractual 
governance 
3.55 2.33 4.28 2.28 0.73 7.49*** 
Relational governance 5.09 1.92 5.44 2.04 0.35 2.43 
 ***p-value<0.01 
 From client's perspective, as shown in the Figure 7, service quality is determined by the 
provider's human resources management capability, provider's risk management capability, 
provider's innovativeness, and relational governance. Client's provider management capability and 
contractual governance don't have significant impacts on the service quality delivered by providers. 
Economic benefits are determined by the contractual and relational governance, client's provider 
management capability, and also provider's service quality. Those three provider's capabilities do 
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not affect client's economic benefits directly. The interactions between relational governance and 
provider's human resources management capability has significant negative effect on service 
quality. Similarly, the interactions between contractual governance and provider's innovativeness, 
and client's provider management capability and provider's innovativeness have weak but 
significant negative effects on service quality.  
 From provider's perspective, as shown in Figure 8, service quality is also determined by 
the three provider's capabilities and relational governance. However, economic benefits realized by 
clients rely solely on the two governance mechanisms. Provider's service quality doesn't have 
significant effect on the economic benefits of clients, neither does the client's capability to manage 
providers. Only the interaction between client's provider management capability and provider's 
innovativeness has significant negative effect on service quality. 
A Summary of hypotheses testing results of entire sample, client informants, and provider 
informants is presented in Table 29. 
 
Table 29: Summary of Hypotheses Testing in This Study 
Hypothesis Entire Sample Client's 
Perspective 
Provider's 
Perspective 
H1: PHRMC -> SQ (+) Supported Supported Supported 
H2: PRMC -> SQ(+) Supported Supported Supported 
H3: PI -> SQ(+) Supported Supported Supported 
H4: CG -> SQ (+) Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
H5: CG -> EB (+) Supported Supported Supported 
H6: RG -> SQ (+) Supported Supported Supported 
H7: RG ->EB (+) Supported Supported Supported 
H8: CPMC -> EB (+) Supported Supported Not Supported 
H9: SQ -> EB (+) Supported Supported Not Supported 
H10a: CG * PHRMC -> SQ (-) Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
H10b: CG * PRMC -> SQ (-) Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
H10c: CG * PI -> SQ (-) Supported Supported Not Supported 
H11a: RG * PHRMC -> SQ (-) Supported Supported Not Supported 
H11b: RG * PRMC -> SQ (-) Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
H11c: RG * PI -> SQ (-) Weakly Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
H12a: CPMC * CG -> EB (-) Weakly Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
H12b: CPMC * RG -> EB (-) Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
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Figure 7: Findings of Research Model from Client's Perspective (n=175) 
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Figure 8: Findings of Research Model from Provider's Perspective (n=131)
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Chapter Six 
 
DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Discussion  
6.1.1 Main Effects 
In this study, we propose a research model to examine independent and joint effects of 
capabilities and governance mechanisms on outsourcing performance. Our results indicate that both 
client’s and provider’s capabilities as well as contractual and relational governance play significant 
roles in shaping outsourcing performance. More specifically, we find that provider’s human 
resources management capability, provider’s risk management capability, provider’s 
innovativeness, and relational governance have significant positive effects on service quality. These 
four factors together explain 72.80% variances service quality. In addition, we reveal that 
contractual and relational governance, client’s provider management capability, and service quality 
influence client’s economic benefits significantly and positively, explaining 53.60% variances of 
client’s economic benefits. We now expand on these findings of main effects. 
 Among these three provider's capabilities, provider's human resources management 
capability has the greatest effect on service quality. This finding is in line with previous studies in 
ITO and BPO (e.g., Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity et al. 2011a).  When providers have high level of 
human resources capability, they are able to have adequate qualified talents at client's firm; offer 
state-of-the-art training to transferred employees from clients; and manage human resources 
effectively to reduce the level of employee turnover (Feeny et al. 2005; Oshri et al. 2007). As a 
result, they are more likely to deliver high quality of service.  
Although provider's risk management capability has been extensively underlined in IS 
studies (e.g., Rottman and Lacity 2004; Smith and McKeen 2004), it has not received adequate 
attention from empirical researchers (Taylor 2007; Narayanan et al. 2011). This study contributes 
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to IS literature by empirically conceptualizing and testing the effect of provider's risk management 
capability on service quality. Our findings clearly indicate that provider's risk management 
capability plays an important role in influencing service quality. Provider's risk management 
capability can help ensure business continuity, which in turn creates a stable business environment 
for providers to deliver high quality of service.  
 Our findings also show that provider's innovativeness has almost the same level of effect 
as provider's human resources management capability on service quality. While Provider's 
innovativeness has been extensively considered in operation management studies (e.g., Merrifield 
1989; Wallenburg 2009), it just received attention from IS scholars recently (e.g., Lacity and 
Willcocks 2013; Willcocks et al. 2013). This study suggests that high level of provider's 
innovativeness can create better service quality. In order to achieve high level of provider's 
innovativeness, it requires inputs from both clients and providers. Clients should focus less on cost 
reduction and more on value-adding objectives (Lacity and Willcocks 2013; 2014). Also, clients 
should provide appropriate incentives for providers to deliver expected innovations (Lacity and 
Willcocks 2013; 2014). On the other hand, providers should focus less on making profits and 
allocate more resources to deliver innovations and creativities (Lacity and Willcocks 2013; 2014). 
However, providers also need to be cautious about overwhelming clients with new ideas that may 
not workable. This is consistent with our finding of significant interaction effect of client's provider 
management capability and provider's innovativeness on service quality. 
 Our findings also suggest that contractual governance has a significant positive effect on 
economic benefits but not service quality. This result implies that clear specification of financial 
terms in an outsourcing contract can ensure clients achieve expected economic benefits, whereas it 
cannot guarantee that providers would deliver desired quality of service. We don’t find significant 
relationship between contractual governance and provider's service quality. One possible reason is 
that our measurement items of contractual governance do not capture protective contractual 
provisions for service quality, rather, we focus more on the financial terms specification in 
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outsourcing contracts. Another possible reason is that contractual governance becomes 
insignificant in the presence of provider's capabilities and relational governance. This argument is 
supported by our data analysis results, see Figure 9. We test a model including only contractual 
governance to predict service quality and economic benefits. The model testing results reveal that 
contractual governance has significant effects on both economics benefits and service quality. It 
alone explains 20.40% variances of service quality and 29.90% variances of economics benefits.  
 
Figure 9: A Model Containing Contractual Governance as the Only Predictor  
 We also find that relational governance is significantly and positively related to both 
service quality and economic benefits. Relational governance is important to service quality from 
both client’s and provider’s views. From client's view, providers are more likely to deliver good 
service quality when clients and providers trust one another and have mutual understanding and 
common ways to work together (Lee and Kim 1999; Sabherwal 1999; Winkler et al. 2008). From 
provider's view, they expect clients to treat them with respect. They also believe that outsourcing 
relationships evolve and mature over the time of the contract and both parties need to invest in 
developing a long-term relationship. Likewise, the impact of relational governance on client's 
economic benefits is also undeniable (Balaji and Brown 2010; Qi and Chau 2012; Wüllenweber et 
al. 2008). From client's perspective, relational governance mechanisms such as harmonious conflict 
resolution mechanisms allow them to focus on value-adding business. Clients also believe that they 
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can maximize business values when they know who to go for questions/issues and when they 
understand provider’s business. From provider's perspective, they think that relational governance 
such as commitment, communication, and mutual understanding of roles and responsibilities is 
critical for them to deliver client's expected business values. 
 Last, our results support the hypothesis that client's provider management capability has a 
significant effect on economic benefits. Even though we don’t hypothesize the effect of client's 
provider management capability on service quality, we also analyze this relationship in our model 
testing. As shown in Table 21, when considering it with other predictor variables, client's provider 
management capability doesn't have significant effect on service quality. However, when we 
consider client's provider management capability as the only predictor of service quality and 
economic benefits, it does demonstrate significant effects on service quality and economic benefits. 
This implies that in the presence of provider's capabilities, relational governance, client's provider 
management capability becomes significant. 
 In summary, with reference to the main effects, first, provider's HR management capability, 
provider's risk management capability, and provider's innovativeness affect service quality directly, 
but not economic benefits. Second, the effects of client's provider management capability and 
contractual governance become insignificant in the presence of provider’s capabilities. Despite that, 
they do affect economic benefits. Third, relational governance is critical to both service quality and 
economic benefits.  
 
6.1.2 Interaction Effects of Capabilities and Governance Mechanisms 
 The interaction effects of governance mechanisms and capabilities on outsourcing 
performance represent another contribution of our research. Prior literature has tended to focus on 
the interaction effect of contractual and relational governance at either a broad level (Poppo and 
Zenger 2002) or a granular level (Goo et al. 2009; Rai et al. 2012). Only a handful of studies have 
examined the interactions among other key determinants of outsourcing performance (e.g., Han et 
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al. 2013; Parmigiani and Mitchell 2010), limiting our insights on how we can efficiently and 
effectively manage these key factors to maximize outsourcing outcomes. Therefore, we extend the 
prior literature to explore the interactions among these key determinants of ITO and BPO 
performance. More specifically, as described in Chapter Five, we find that the positive effects of 
three provider's capabilities on service quality are reduced in the presence of relational governance. 
In addition, in the presence of contractual governance, the positive effects of provider's 
innovativeness on service quality and of client's provider management capability on economic 
benefits are reduced. Further, we also find an interaction effect between client's provider 
management capability and provider's innovativeness on service quality. Strong client's provider 
management capability reduces the impact of provider's innovativeness on service quality. 
 In this study, we are not arguing that governance mechanisms and capabilities can 
substitute one another. Rather, we propose that both governance mechanisms and capabilities are 
critical to outsourcing performance while the presence of governance mechanisms reduces the 
effects of capabilities on outsourcing performance. We make this argument for the following two 
reasons. First, as suggested by Poppo and Zenger (2002), a complete and reliable test without 
information loss for substitutability should incorporate both negative bi-directional links and 
negative interaction effects. Our testing results of bi-directional links between relational 
governance and three provider’s capabilities, contractual governance and provider’s innovativeness, 
and contractual governance and client’s provider management capability are all significant and 
positive (See Table 30). Second, as indicated by the patterns of interaction effects (see Table 23), 
client's and provider's capabilities have significant positive effects on outsourcing performance no 
matter what the level of governance mechanisms is. Thereby, clients and providers in an 
outsourcing relationship should consider carefully about how to manage capabilities with 
governance mechanisms in order to achieve optimal outsourcing performance. We expand the 
discussion of each interaction as below. 
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Table 30: Testing Results of Bi-directional Links 
Independent Variables 
Dependent  Variables 
RG CG PHRMC PRMC PI CPMC 
Provider's human resources 
management capability 
(PHRMC) 
0.36***      
Provider's risk management 
capability (PRMC) 
0.21***      
Provider's innovativeness 
(PI) 
0.21*** 0.21***     
Relational governance 
(RG) 
  0.63*** 0.56*** 0.48***  
Contractual governance 
(CG) 
    0.16*** 0.5*** 
Client's provider 
management capability 
(CPMC) 
 0.41***     
*** p-value < 0.001 
  
The interaction between contractual governance and provider innovativeness has a 
negative effect on service quality. As shown in Figure 4a and Table 23, when contractual 
governance is low, service quality relies heavily on the provider's innovativeness. In contrast, when 
contractual governance is high, the significant positive effect of provider's innovativeness on 
service quality decreases. The core implication is that using contracts to monitor outsourcing 
performance is important in particular when providers have low capability to deliver innovations 
and creativities. Our findings also suggest that clients probably should emphasize less on contract 
terms when provider's innovativeness is high in order to receive better service quality.  
 The interactions between relational governance and three provider's capabilities have 
negative effects on service quality. As shown in Figure 4b-d and Table 23, in the presence of strong 
relational governance, the effects of the three provider's capabilities on service quality are reduced. 
The role of relational governance in influencing outsourcing performance, has been repeatedly 
emphasized in ITO and BPO research (e.g., Goo et al. 2009; Kern and Willcocks 2002; Klepper 
1995; Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity et al. 2011a; Poppo and Zenger 2002; Rai et al. 2012 ). Relational 
governance contains elements such as trust (Sabherwal 1999), communication (Sen and Shiel 2006), 
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mutual understanding (Kern and Willcocks 2002), effective knowledge sharing (Rottman and 
Lacity 2006), and conflict resolution (Goo et al. 2009). In the presence of strong relational 
governance, clients and providers in general would have a good relationship (Alami et al. 2008; 
Sen and Shiel 2006), thereby creating a trustful and committed environment for the parties. Our 
results suggest that strong relational governance would encourage providers to deliver best service 
quality they could, even when they have poor capabilities in human resources management, risk 
management, and innovativeness. In contrast, when relational governance is low, implying a bad 
relationship between clients and providers, service quality is highly dependent upon provider's 
capabilities. Among these three interactions, the interaction between relational governance and 
provider's human resources management has the greatest effect. This implies that in presence of 
strong relational governance, providers would assign high quality staff to work on the outsourcing 
projects even when they have high rate of attrition or less sophisticated training for employees. 
 The interaction between contractual governance and client's provider management 
capability has a negative effect on economic benefits. As seen in Figure 4f and Table 23, when 
contractual governance is high, indicating that clients and providers have clearly specified financial 
terms and incentive mechanisms appropriately in a contract, client's economic benefits may depend 
less on client's provider management capability. Appropriate incentives such as revenue sharing 
would encourage providers to deliver expected outcomes, e.g., cost reduction or innovations 
(Lacity and Willcocks 2013; Lacity and Willcocks 2014), even when the level of client’s controls 
is level. On the other hand, when the contractual governance is low, clients need to have processes, 
tools, or technologies in place to monitor providers for achieving economic benefits. 
 Besides hypothesized interactions, we also tested the interactions between contractual and 
relational governance, and between client's provider management capability and the three 
provider's capabilities on service quality and economic benefits.  
 We don’t find any significant or even marginally significant interaction effect of 
contractual and relational governance. This is different from the findings in previous studies (e.g., 
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Goo et al. 2009; Poppo and Zenger 2002; Rai et al. 2012). Poppo and Zenger (2002) and Goo et al. 
(2009) find that contractual and relational governance act as complements in influencing ITO 
performance. Rai et al. (2002) reveal that contractual and relational governance serves as substitutes 
in affecting BPO performance. One difference between these three studies and our study is that the 
above three studies include only contractual and relational governance in their research model, 
excluding other determinants of outsourcing performance. One possible reason is that the 
interaction of contractual and relational governance become insignificant after considering other 
determinants.  
 Among the interactions between client's provider management capability and the three 
provider's capabilities, we find only the interaction between client's provider management 
capability and provider's innovativeness is significant. As seen in Figure 4e and Table 23, the 
significant effect of provider's innovativeness on service quality is reduced in the presence of strong 
client's provider management capability. When client's provider management capability is low, 
service quality depends more on provider's innovativeness. In contrast, when client's capability to 
manage providers is high, even lower level of provider's innovativeness can generate moderate 
level of service quality. The core implication is that clients cannot just hand over outsourcing 
arrangements to providers and count on providers for high quality of service, rather, they should 
execute controls using well-designed processes, tools or technologies. This is consistent with what 
have been proposed in the prior literature (e.g., Feeny and Willcocks 1998; Sanders et al. 2007). 
 
6.1.3 Mediating Effect of Service Quality 
 Another contribution of this study is that it affirms the mediating effects of service quality 
on the relationships between three provider's capabilities and economic benefits. Previous studies 
have proposed that service quality may act as an intervening factor in influencing outsourcing 
performance (Chakrabarty et al. 2008; Grover et al. 1996). Grover et al. (1996) examine the 
moderating effect of service quality on the relationship between degree of outsourcing and 
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outsourcing success in ITO. They conclude that service quality directly influence outsourcing 
success rather than act as a moderator. Chakrabarty et al. (2008) propose that service quality may 
act as the mediator between relationship quality and user satisfaction in BPO but they don't 
empirically test it. In addition, many previous studies have argued that provider's human resource 
management capability (e.g., Lacity et al. 2004; Rao et al. 2006), risk management capability (e.g., 
Narayanan et al. 2011) , and innovativeness (e.g., Willcocks et al. 2013) are critical to realize 
expected client's economic benefits. Furthermore, prior work has also empirically confirmed that 
service quality can help clients achieve better business values (Rajeev and Vani 2009). In this study, 
we argue that service quality mediates the relationships between provider's capabilities and client's 
economic benefits. That is, in the presence of service quality, the direct effects of the three provider' 
capabilities on client's economic benefits become less significant or even insignificant.  
 As shown in Table 24 and Figure 5, when considering economic benefits as the dependent 
variable and the three provider's capabilities as the only predictors, all of them have positive effects 
on economic benefits. They together explain 35.10% variances of economic benefits. Similarity, 
when considering service quality as the dependent variable and the three provider's capabilities as 
the predictors, all of them affect service quality significantly and positively. They together explain 
64.70% variances of service quality. Yet, when considering the impacts of the three provider's 
capabilities and service quality together on economic benefits, the effects of the three provider's 
capabilities become insignificant. Service quality alone explains 40.60% variances of economic 
benefits, more than the variances explained by the three provider’s capabilities. These results, taken 
together, indicate that service quality fully mediates the relationships among provider's capabilities 
(i.e., provider's human resources management capability, provider's risk management capability, 
and provider's innovativeness) and economic benefits. That is to say, provider's capabilities don't 
influence economic benefits directly, rather, they influence it through service quality. 
 
6.1.4 Comparing Client's and Provider's Perspectives 
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 Our results also suggest that clients and providers view the relationships in our research 
model differently, a finding that fills a gap of lacking comparative studies in IS literature (Dibbern 
et al. 2004). 
 Main Effects. As seen in Figure 7, from client's perspective, service quality of provider is 
determined by provider's human resources management capability, provider's risk management 
capability, provider's innovativeness, and relational governance. Client's provider management 
capability and contractual governance don't have significant impacts on service quality delivered 
by providers. These factors explain 74% variances of service quality. Economic benefits realization 
of clients is determined by two governance mechanisms (relational and contractual), client's 
provider management capability, and also provider's service quality. These three provider's 
capabilities do not affect client's economic benefits directly. Two governance mechanisms and 
client's provider management capability along with service quality explain 55.30% variances of 
economic benefits. These findings are pretty consistent with the findings of our entire sample.  
 In contrast, as shown in Figure 8, from provider's perspective, service quality is also 
determined by the three provider's capabilities and relational governance. They together explains 
67.5% variances of service quality. However, economic benefits realized by clients rely more on 
the two governance mechanisms. Provider's service quality doesn't have significant effect on 
economic benefits of clients, neither does client's capability to manage providers. The two 
governance mechanisms explain 52.8% variances of economic benefits. 
 Interaction Effects. Our results of client informants support two hypothesized interaction 
effects. These two are interaction between relational governance and provider's human resources 
management capability and interaction between contractual governance and provider's 
innovativeness. When examining the hypothesized interaction effects with provider informants, 
none of the hypothesize interaction effect was supported. Interestingly, the un-hypothesized 
interaction between client's provider management capability and provider's innovativeness has 
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significant and marginally significant effect on service quality from client's and provider's 
perspectives respectively. Figure 10 depicts the interaction effects. 
  
  
Figure 10: Significant Interaction Effects from Client's and Provider's Perspectives 
  Overall, the comparison of findings from client's and provider's perspectives suggests that 
from client's view, service quality depends on provider's capabilities and relational governance. 
Also, client's provider management capability plays a significant role in achieving expected 
economic benefits. However, from provider's view, they consider that service quality largely 
depends on their own capabilities and economic benefits relies on governance mechanisms. They 
don't think client's provider management capability influence either of outsourcing outcome, yet, 
they do agree that client's provider management capability can moderate the relationship between 
provider's innovativeness and service quality. In the presence of strong client's capability, providers 
are more likely to deliver better service quality.  
 
104 
 
6.2 Implications 
6.2.1 Theoretical Implications 
 Our findings have a number of significant theoretical implications for understanding 
outsourcing performance, more specifically, for our understanding of effective governance to 
achieve high performance in ITO and BPO. First, this study is the first attempt to conceptually and 
empirically investigate the relationships between capabilities and governance mechanisms. 
Conceptually, we develop a framework to measure client's provider management capability, three 
provider's capabilities, and contractual and relational governance based on IS literature and best 
practices of outsourcing industry. Empirically, we validate the measurement model of capabilities 
and governance mechanisms, and tested their relationships using the survey data collected from 
outsourcing practitioners. Second, our results indicate that a set of capabilities and governance 
mechanisms are predictive of provider's service quality and client's economic benefits, two most 
important outcome variables in outsourcing literature (Grover et al. 1996; Jiang et al. 2000). Third, 
we find that the significant positive effects of client's and provider's capabilities on outsourcing 
performance attenuate in the presence of strong governance mechanisms. The investigation of 
interaction effects fills the gap of lack of studies on interactions in IS literature (Karimi-
Alaghehband et al. 2011; Lacity et al. 2011b). In addition, these interaction effects contribute to 
our theoretical understanding of outsourcing performance, offering richer insights of how clients 
and providers should design their governance mechanisms with capabilities in order to achieve high 
ITO and BPO performance. Fourth, our results also reveal that provider’s capabilities don't affect 
client's economic benefits directly. Rather, they affect it through quality of their services. Last, the 
comparison of findings from client informants and provider informants suggest that clients and 
providers view the independent and joint effects of capabilities and governance mechanisms on 
outsourcing performance differently.   
 
6.2.2 Implications for Practitioners 
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 This study also provides significant implications for outsourcing practitioners including 
clients, providers, and advisors. First, this study highlights those capabilities and governance 
mechanisms that are important to achieve better service quality and assist in realizing client's 
economic benefits, including provider's human resources management capability, provider's risk 
management capability, provider's innovativeness, client's provider management capability, 
contractual governance, and relational governance. Thus, clients and providers can focus on 
developing these capabilities, improving controls, and fostering better relationships to achieve high 
ITO or BPO performance. 
 Second, this study informs outsourcing practitioners how client's and provider's capabilities 
interact with governance mechanisms in influencing outsourcing performance. This provides 
insights for them to effectively design governance mechanisms in the presence of client's and 
provider's capabilities. When providers have poor capabilities, strong governance mechanisms 
should be in place for the purpose of achieving expected outcomes. For instance, when providers 
have poor human resources management capability, strong relational governance may help clients 
achieve desired level of services. Likewise, when provider's innovativeness is low, clients can 
provide some incentives for providers to deliver high quality of service. In addition, when clients 
and providers already have a well-specified contract in place, clients can invest less in developing 
their skills to manage providers. By doing this, clients can switch their focus to internal core 
activities.  
 Third, this study examines relationships in the research model from both client’s and 
provider’s perspectives. From client's view, the success of an outsourcing arrangement should get 
both clients and providers involved and have strong governance mechanisms in place. On the other 
hand, from provider's view, high quality of services are primarily dependent on them and 
governance mechanisms such as appropriately designed contracts, a long-term and healthy 
relationship can ensure client's economic benefits realization. In an outsourcing arrangement, it is 
always important to understand the opinions or thoughts of the other party. Our findings provide 
106 
 
insights for clients and providers to better understand each other. Through better communication 
and understanding, providers can deliver better services and clients can improve their management 
on the outsourcing arrangements. 
 Last, this study also highlights that provider's business risk has significant negative effects 
on service quality and economic benefits. Therefore, providers should have certain strategies in 
place to reduce the level of business risks. They can move their services to locations where have 
stable business environment and infrastructures. Similarly, clients should carefully select 
outsourcing destination as well as providers. Clients should look for providers who have sound 
financial status and good reputation and outsourcing destination that has stable political 
environment and attractive financial policies. 
 
6.3 Limitations and Future Directions 
 This study has some limitations that need caution and we discuss them below. First, this 
study is limited by an inability to design and develop survey instruments to measure constructs in 
the research model. The measurement model of constructs is identified from a secondary dataset 
from outsourcing practitioners. We determine the measurement model of constructs in two steps: 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and cross coding. We use EFA to identify the number of 
components in the dataset. Then we read the survey questions in the VHCS carefully to categorize 
them into different components. Based on the results of EFA and cross coding, we identify the 
measurement items of client's provider management capability, provider's human resources 
management capability, provider's risk management capability, provider's innovativeness, service 
quality, economic benefits, and business risk. When using a secondary data set, we are unable to 
create our own survey instruments. Thus, for some constructs, we only have two measurement 
items, for instance, provider's innovativeness and business risk. However, the industry data in our 
study are especially important and valuable, given the fact that firms purchase licenses to take the 
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survey. Accordingly, they may provide more real and accurate information about their outsourcing 
arrangements.  
 Second, the majority of the participating firms in our data are large-cap firms and primarily 
from the United States. Results of our study would surely be more insightful if we can incorporate 
small and mediums firms from other countries into our study. Therefore, future research can further 
advance our understanding by investigating small and mediums firms outside the United States. 
 Third, we only consider one client's capability in this study due to the limitation of 
secondary data. Previous studies have identified other important client's capabilities in ITO and 
BPO such as client's cultural distance management capability, client's technological and 
methodological capability, and client's risk management capability (see Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity 
et al. 2011a). Future work is needed to examine the role of other critical client's capabilities in 
outsourcing arrangements. 
 Fourth, this study examines the moderating effects of contractual and relational governance 
at the broad level. We don’t investigate how contractual governance factors such as goal 
expectations and contractual flexibility (Rai et al. 2012), and relational governance factors such as 
trust and conflict resolution (Goo et al. 2009; Rai et al. 2012)  affect the relationships between 
client's and provider capabilities and outsourcing performance. Future research would add values 
to IS literature by examining the moderating effects of contractual and relational governance factors 
using a granular approach (Tiwana 2010).    
 Last, we examine the main effects and interaction effects of capabilities and governance 
mechanisms at a single point in time. Prior literature has argued that outsourcing relationship is 
dynamic and evolving (Whitley and Willcocks 2011). There is a learning curve existing for both 
clients and providers. For example, at the initial phase of outsourcing, involved parties tend to use 
more contractual governance. They manage the outsourcing relationship based on SLAs and focus 
on costs. However, as they get mature and learn more from their experience or mistakes, they begin 
to use more relational governance. Thus, contractual governance may play more critical role than 
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relational governance in influencing service quality at the initial stage of outsourcing arrangement. 
Longitudinal studies in the future can provide insights to understand the dynamic and evolving 
nature of outsourcing relationship. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 Our study is the first attempt to incorporate capabilities and governance mechanisms into 
a research model and empirically test their main effects and interaction effects on outsourcing 
performance. This provides a holistic and robust view of an outsourcing relationship (Goo et al. 
2009). First, our results suggest that capabilities and governance mechanisms affect service quality 
and economic benefit differently. In particular, service quality is determined by provider's human 
resources management capability, provider's risk management capability, provider's innovativeness, 
and relational governance, while economic benefits is determined by contractual and relational 
governance, client's provider management capability, and service quality.  Second, our findings 
indicate that governance mechanisms negatively moderates the relationships between capabilities 
and outsourcing performance. More specifically, we find that in the presence of strong relational 
governance, the positive effects of three provider's capabilities (provider's human resources 
management capability, provider's risk management capability, provider's innovativeness) on 
service quality are reduced. Similarly, in the presence of contractual governance, the positive effect 
on provider's innovativeness on service quality is also reduced. In addition, in the presence of 
contractual governance, the positive effect of client's provider management capability on economic 
benefits decreases. Third, our findings reveal that service quality fully mediates the relationships 
among the three provider’s capabilities and economic benefits. That is, provider’s capabilities do 
not affect client’s economic benefits directly, instead, they affect it through service quality. Fourth, 
our results also indicate that clients and providers perceive the relationships between determinants 
(i.e., capabilities and governance mechanisms) and outsourcing performance (i.e., service quality 
and economic benefits) differently. This is consistent with the call made by Dibbern et al. (2004) 
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to conduct more comparative studies in IS outsourcing. Overall, this study contributes to IS 
literature as well as to practical outsourcing management. It suggests that management strategies 
that appropriately configure capabilities with governance mechanisms may be particularly effective 
for outsourcing governance.  
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